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PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE SOCIETY‟S RESPONSE TO OFFENDERS
WITH A MENTAL DISORDER
For almost as long as there has been a criminal justice
system, society has struggled with how to respond to
offenders with a mental disorder whose criminal behavior
has been shaped and driven by their mental disorder.
Virtually everyone who works with this population,
including criminal justice officials, believes that society‟s
current response is woefully inadequate. This Article will
propose an alternative approach that can provide a better
response for all of the parties affected by these crimes,
including the victims of these crimes and the offenders
themselves. At the same time, there is a general lack of
overarching principles to guide such analyses. Based on a
review of the current literature and a growing consensus
regarding various points drawn from this literature, this
Article begins with an effort to articulate these principles
before turning to the proposed model and its foundations:
(1) Many individuals within society have a mental
disorder.1
1. Julie Steenhuysen, Nearly 1 in 5 Americans Had Mental Illness in 2009,
REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/18/us-usamentalhealth-idUSTRE6AH4GW20101118 (“More than 45 million Americans,
or 20 percent of U.S. adults, had some form of mental illness last year, and 11
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(2) Mental disorders are not monolithic, but encompass
a widely diverse set of conditions. They appear in many
forms and affect individuals in many different ways. Their
impact on capacities, abilities, emotions, and behavior vary
enormously.2
(3) A mental disorder is not an all-or-nothing
phenomenon. It tends to fluctuate significantly over time
and to interfere with some functions but not others.3
(4) A mental disorder can be debilitating, disorienting,
frightening, or overpowering to the person experiencing it.4
(5) Mental disorders tend to be misunderstood and can
be upsetting or frightening to observers, but the likelihood
of resulting dangerous behavior is widely overestimated.5

million had a serious illness . . . . Young adults aged 18 to 25 had the highest
level of mental illness at 30 percent . . . .”); see also Steven Reinberg, CDC: Half
of Americans Will Suffer from Mental Health Woes, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2011),
http://yourlife.usatoday.com/health/medical/mentalhealth/story/2011-0905/CDCHalf-of-Americans-will-suffer-from-mental-health-woes/50250702/1 (“About half
of Americans will experience some form of mental health problem at some point
in their life . . . .” (citing CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, MENTAL ILLNESS SURVEILLANCE
AMONG ADULTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2011))).
2. U.S. DEP‟T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF
SURGEON GENERAL 5 (1999) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL‟S REPORT]
(“Many ingredients of mental health may be identifiable, but mental health is
not easy to define.”).
THE

3. Id. at 17 (“[R]elatively few mental illnesses have an unremitting course
marked by the most acute manifestations of illness; rather, for reasons that are
not yet understood, the symptoms associated with mental illness tend to wax
and wane.”).
4. In fact, the Council of State Governments has noted:
People with mental illness are falling through the cracks of this
country‟s social safety net . . . .
. . . [A] large number of people with mental illness . . . have been
incarcerated because they displayed in public the symptoms of
untreated mental illness. Experiencing delusions, immobilized by
depression, or suffering other consequences . . . many of these
individuals have struggled, at times heroically, to fend off symptoms of
mental illness.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV‟TS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS
PROJECT, at xii (2002).
5. As the U.S. Surgeon General has explained:
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(6) Individuals with a mental illness are more likely to
come into contact with the criminal justice system.6 A
significant proportion of individuals whose actions are
brought to the attention of the criminal justice system have
a mental illness.7
Are people with mental disorders truly more violent? Research supports
some public concerns, but the overall likelihood of violence is low. The
greatest risk of violence is from those who have dual diagnoses, i.e.,
individuals who have a mental disorder as well as a substance abuse
disorder. . . . In fact, there is very little risk of violence or harm to a
stranger from casual contact with an individual who has a mental
disorder. Because the average person is ill-equipped to judge whether
someone who is behaving erratically has any of these disorders, alone
or in combination, the natural tendency is to be wary. Yet to put this all
in perspective, the overall contribution of mental disorders to the total
level of violence in society is exceptionally small.
SURGEON GENERAL‟S REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis omitted) (citations
omitted); see also Understanding Mental Illness: Factsheet, SUBSTANCE ABUSE
AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.samhsa.gov/mentalhealth/
understanding_Mentalllness_Factsheet.aspx (last updated Sept. 24, 2008) (“A
consensus statement signed by more than three dozen lawyers, advocates,
consumers/survivors, and mental health professionals reads in part: „The results
of several recent large-scale research projects conclude that only a weak
association between mental disorders and violence exists in the community.
Serious violence by people with major mental disorders appears concentrated in
a small fraction of the total number, and especially in those who use alcohol and
other drugs.‟” (quoting John Monahan & Jean Arnold, Violence by People with
Mental Illness: A Consensus Statement by Advocates and Researchers,
PSYCHIATRIC REHAB. J., Spring 1996 at 67, 70)).
6. Mental Health Early Intervention, Treatment, and Prevention Act of
2000, S. 2639, 106th Cong. (2000) (“Twenty-five to 40 percent of the individuals
who suffer from a mental illness . . . will come into contact with the criminal
justice system each year.”).
7. Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with
Mental Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 D.C. L.
REV. 143, 145 (2003) (“During street encounters, police officers are almost twice
as likely to arrest someone who appears to have a mental illness.”); see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 17 (2003) (“In 2000, the American Psychiatric Association
reported research estimates that perhaps as many as one in five prisoners were
seriously mentally ill, with up to 5 percent actively psychotic at any given
moment.” (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND
PRISONS, at xix (2d ed. 2000))); DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP‟T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON
AND JAIL INMATES 1-2 (2006) [hereinafter BJS REPORT] (“[M]ore than half of all
prison and jail inmates ha[ve] a mental health problem . . . .”).

2012]

FORGING LINKS AND RENEWING TIES

151

(7) Persons with a mental disorder should be afforded
the respect and dignity to which all human beings are
entitled.8 Human interactions generally remain important
to them and how they are treated by others and society
often has a significant impact on them.9
(8) Like all human beings, persons with a mental
disorder may be involved in relationships where friction,
disputes, and altercations occur.10 Nevertheless, the
maintenance of these relationships can be of considerable
importance to them as well as to the other involved
individuals.11

8. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 3,
G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006); Press Release, U.N.
Dep‟t of Pub. Info., With 20 Ratifications, Landmark Disability Treaty Set to
Enter into Force on 3 May, U.N. Press Release HR/4941 (Apr. 3, 2008).
9. See Victoria Maxwell, This Won‟t Hurt a Bit, Really: Dating After Mental
Illness, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 17, 2009, 9:26 PM), http://www.psychology
today.com/print/4384 (“[W]e don‟t leave our hearts and desires behind when we
get a diagnosis. We take them with us, along with our bodies, minds (yes our
minds) and spirits as we walk or, in my case, stumble our way to recovery. And
that‟s the point isn‟t it? Not how graceful we are, but that we‟re heading in the
right direction and surrounded, hopefully, with people who are heading our way
too.”).
10. See, e.g., DANIEL MACKLER & MATTHEW MORRISSEY, A WAY OUT OF
MADNESS: DEALING WITH YOUR FAMILY AFTER YOU‟VE BEEN DIAGNOSED WITH A
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER 5-6 (2010) (“The family is one of the most powerful forces
in the universe . . . . [F]amilies can have a profound effect on the course of a
person‟s emotional life and, specifically, the course of a psychiatric disorder.”);
id. at 3 (“[W]hen you experience severe emotional problems, particularly those
that get diagnosed as mental disorders or lead to psychiatric hospitalizations,
these [normal and expected] conflicts [with your family] are often heightened.
. . . This [disruption] can throw your entire family into further turmoil,
worsening your dilemma.”).
11. For example, Hafemeister and Vallas have noted that:
Of all human desires, the longing for intimacy with another human
being is one of the most intense. Yet despite the fundamental nature of
this desire, for many it remains elusive. Intimate relationships can be
difficult to establish, daunting to maintain, and devastating to lose.
They can be a minefield for individuals who are relatively free of
behavioral, cognitive, or emotional impediments. The quest for
intimacy, however, is particularly complex and challenging for those
with a mental disorder as such a disorder can limit and impede social
interactions, while associated stereotypes and stigma routinely disrupt
potential and existing relationships.
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(9) Persons with a mental disorder can: (a) learn from
the consequences of their behavior, (b) benefit from being
held accountable for criminal behavior, (c) be deterred from
further criminal behavior, and (d) change their behavior,
although they may have an impaired capacity to do so that
may require special assistance.12
(10) Persons with a mental disorder can feel remorse for
criminal behavior and empathy for victims of that behavior,
although they may have an impaired capacity to do so that
may require special assistance.13
(11) Persons with a mental disorder can generally
communicate thoughts about the behavior that led to their
involvement in the criminal justice system,14 although they
may have an impaired capacity to do so that may require
special assistance. They may sometimes feel their criminal
Thomas L. Hafemeister & Rebecca Vallas, Intimate Partner Violence and
Victims with a Mental Disorder: What Do You Do When It Seems Like All Your
Choices Are Lousy and Screaming for Help Just Makes Things Worse
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author).
12. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP‟T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON MENTAL HEALTH
RECOVERY 2 (2006) (“Consumers have a personal responsibility for their own
self-care and journeys of recovery. Taking steps towards their goals may require
great courage. [They] must strive to understand and give meaning to their
experiences and identify coping strategies and healing processes to promote
their own wellness.”).
13. See id. (“Consumers encourage and engage other consumers in recovery
and provide each other with a sense of belonging, supportive relationships,
valued roles, and community.”).
14. MACKLER & MORRISSEY, supra note 10, at 4 (“[Your parents and family]
may think they understand what is going on in your life and in your thoughts,
but that does not always mean they do. Sometimes your inner world is just too
painful for them to comprehend, especially if they feel partially responsible.
This, however, may not stop them from thinking they know what is best for you.
This can leave you feeling controlled, judged, and even stigmatized, which at the
very least can be frustrating, and at the worst disempowering and alienating.
This not only impedes your recovery but can also heighten the intensity of
family conflict.”); Norman G. Poythress et al., Perceived Coercion and
Procedural Justice in the Broward Mental Health Court, 25 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 517, 520 (2002) (“Research in a variety of conflict resolution
contexts suggests that perceived fairness of the process is perhaps the most
critical determinant of procedural justice. Key factors that affect perceived
fairness include (1) voice (having one‟s own side of the dispute presented to and
heard by the decision maker) and (2) being treated with respect and dignity by
the authoritative decision maker.”).
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behavior was justified or understandable, and they may
believe, sometimes justly, that they have been treated
unfairly by the criminal justice system or society.15
(12) Persons with a mental disorder may be less
culpable for their criminal behavior because of an
impairment of their ability to (a) appreciate the nature,
character, or consequences of their behavior; (b) appreciate
that their behavior was wrong; (c) conform their behavior to
the requirements of the law; or (d) choose between right and
wrong, although the standard varies and this disposition
tends to be controversial.16
15. As Bernstein and Seltzer have indicated:
Contact with the criminal and juvenile justice systems obviously has
significant negative consequences for anyone who is subject to arrest,
booking and incarceration. It can be doubly traumatic for people with
mental illnesses, and the resulting criminal record can impede their
later access to housing and mental health services. Their increasing
“criminalization” is generating concern among policy-makers, criminal
and juvenile justice administrators, families and advocates. A great
many of the individuals arrested are charged with only minor offenses
for which others are not usually subject to arrest. For most, the
underlying issue is their need for basic services and supports that
public systems have failed to deliver in meaningful ways.
Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 7, at 143 (footnotes omitted); see also Poythress
et al., supra note 14, at 523, 527 (finding higher satisfaction levels when
defendants believed they had been given an “opportunity to tell the judge . . .
about [their] personal and legal situation”).
16. In Clark v. Arizona, for example, the United States Supreme Court held:
The landmark English rule in M‟Naghten‟s Case . . . states that
the jurors ought to be told . . . that to establish a defence on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time
of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong.
The first part asks about cognitive capacity: whether a mental defect
leaves a defendant unable to understand what he is doing. The second
part presents an ostensibly alternative basis for recognizing
a defense of insanity understood as a lack of moral capacity: whether a
mental disease or defect leaves a defendant unable to understand that
his action is wrong.
548 U.S. 735, 747 (2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
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(13) Responding appropriately to a criminal offender
with a mental disorder tends to be a complex undertaking
as mental disorders and the challenges they entail tend to
be multi-faceted. Complicating factors include (a) cooccurrence with a substance abuse disorder; (b) a lack of
employment, housing, and support; and (c) the individual‟s
history of having experienced discrimination, stigma,
prejudice, misunderstanding, and mistreatment. Crafting
an appropriate response needs to take such factors into
account.17
(14) Placement of an individual with a serious mental
disorder within a correctional facility tends to place such
individuals at risk of harming themselves or being harmed
by others. Such facilities generally do not provide an
appropriate environment for the treatment of these
individuals.18
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 234 (2d ed. 2004)
(“The clinical evaluation of [mental state at the time of the offense] is one of the
more difficult assessments in forensic work.”); Edwin R. Keedy, Insanity and
Criminal Responsibility, 30 HARV. L. REV. 535, 535 (1917) (“The feud between
medical men and lawyers in all questions concerning the criminal liability of
lunatics is of old standing. More than one authority on either side has tried to
bring about a reconciliation between the contending parties. But their
endeavors have been crowned with very little success. For though it cannot be
denied that the strife and warfare has of late lost much of its former bitterness,
a modus vivendi satisfactory to both parties has not been found.” (quoting
HEINRICH OPPENHEIMER, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LUNATICS, at iii (1909))).
17. See PRESIDENT‟S NEW FREEDOM COMM‟N ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING
PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 32 (2003)
(“People with serious mental illnesses who come into contact with the criminal
justice system are often: Poor, [u]ninsured, [d]isproportionately members of
minority groups, [and] [h]omeless . . . .”).
THE

18. For example, Kupers has noted that:
For mentally disordered prisoners, danger lurks everywhere. They
tend to have great difficulty coping with the prison code—either they
are intimidated by staff into snitching or they are manipulated by other
prisoners into doing things that get them into deep trouble . . .
Male
and
female
mentally
disordered
prisoners
are
disproportionately represented among the victims of rape . . . . Many
voluntarily isolate themselves in their cells in order to avoid
trouble. . . .
...
Prisoners who are clearly psychotic and chronically disturbed are
called “dings” and “bugs” by other prisoners, and victimized. [Their]
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(15) There are a number of models for (a) diverting
individuals with a mental disorder from the criminal justice
system, (b) enhancing the likelihood that they will succeed
upon returning to the community, and (c) minimizing the
likelihood that they will re-offend or otherwise run afoul of
the criminal justice system again. The appropriate model
will vary depending on the needs of the individual and the
resources available, with the availability of resources posing
a continuing challenge.19
INTRODUCTION
When does society‟s imposition of criminal punishment
become self-defeating and lose sight of the fact that it may
be better served by exploring alternative means of
redressing an offender‟s behavior? For the past forty years
the number of incarcerated individuals in the United States
has steadily grown to the point where the per capita rate of
incarceration exceeds that of every other country in the
world.20 In addition, a significant proportion of this
population consists of individuals with a mental disorder.
American jails and prisons have become the de facto mental
health system of this country, notwithstanding a
widespread consensus that incarcerating these individuals
is often inappropriate and counterproductive.21

anti-psychotic medications slow their reaction times, which makes
them more vulnerable to “blind-siding,” an attack from the side or from
behind by another prisoner.
TERRY KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS AND
WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT 18-20 (1999).
19. See Position Statement 52: In Support of Maximum Diversion of Persons
with Serious Mental Illness from the Criminal Justice System, MENTAL HEALTH
AMERICA (June 8, 2008), http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/go/positionstatements/52 (“The extraordinary human and financial costs to the criminal
justice system argue strongly that effective diversion may produce better results
at a lower cost. Community-based programs for people with mental illness and
substance use conditions would help to provide not only appropriate treatment
for them, but would decrease duration or even prevent incarceration
altogether.”).
20. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Op-Ed., The Mentally Ill, Behind Bars, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A15; see also infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part II.
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As many as one in four, or nearly sixty million,
American adults suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder22
in any given year.23 Between 5% to 7% of the U.S.
population over the age of eighteen—as many as twenty
million people—suffer from a serious mental illness such as
schizophrenia, major depression, or a bipolar disorder, 24
with 46% of Americans struggling with some form of mental
illness during their lifetime.25 Further, more than 10% of
the adult population experience serious psychological
22. The leading diagnostic reference source conceptualizes a mental disorder
as:
[A] clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or
pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present
distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one
or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly
increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss
of freedom.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS‟N, DIAGNOSTIC
DISORDERS, at xxxi (4th ed. 2000).

AND

STATISTICAL MANUAL

OF

MENTAL

23. See Statistics—Any Disorder Among Adults, NAT‟L INST. OF MENTAL
HEALTH,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/1ANYDIS_ADULT.shtml
(last
visited Dec. 17, 2011); see also Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence, Severity, and
Comorbidity of 12-Month DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey
Replication, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 617, 619 (2005) (“Twelve-month
prevalence of any [mental] disorder was 26.2% . . . .”); Steenhuysen, supra note
1 (“Young adults ages 18 to 25 had the highest level of mental illness at 30
percent . . . .”); Pinka Chatterji et al., Psychiatric Disorders and Employment:
New Evidence from the Collaborative Psychiatric Epidemiology Surveys 2 (Nat‟l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14404, 2008).
24. THE PRESIDENT‟S NEW FREEDOM COMM‟N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note
17, at 2; see also NAT‟L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, MENTAL ILLNESSES:
TREATMENT SAVES MONEY & MAKES SENSE 1 (2007) [hereinafter NAMI, MENTAL
ILLNESSES]; What Is Mental Illness: Mental Illness Facts, NAT‟L ALLIANCE ON
MENTAL
ILLNESS,
http://www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Inform_
Yourself/About_Mental_Illness/About_Mental_Illness.htm (last visited Dec. 17,
2011).
25. Ronald C. Kessler et al., Lifetime Prevalence and Age-of-Onset
Distributions of DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey
Replication, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 593, 595 (2005); see also OFFICE OF
APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP‟T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND
HEALTH REPORT: SERIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS AND RECEIPT OF MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES (2008) [hereinafter SAMHSA REPORT], available at
http://oas.samhsa.gov/2k9/SPDtx/SPDtx.pdf (providing additional information
regarding the prevalence of serious mental illness and rates of treatment).
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distress during any given year,26 and mental illness is the
leading cause of disability in the United States for people
between the ages of fifteen and forty-four.27 Despite the
prevalence of mental disorders and their debilitating
impact, and despite increasing recognition that mental
disorders can result in disorganized thought processes,
impaired reality testing, poor planning and problem solving
skills, and impulsivity,28 the criminal justice system (“CJS”)
continues to absorb and struggle with a massive number of
individuals with a mental disorder.
In recent years, a restorative justice approach has
resurfaced in many countries, including the United States,
as a complementary alternative to the traditional criminal

26. SAMHSA REPORT, supra note 25, at 1, 3 n.1. Not everyone with a mental
illness experiences “serious psychological distress” at any given time, in part
because of fluctuations in the nature and impact of a psychiatric disorder and in
part because treatment may at various times successfully limit or minimize this
distress. See Satvinder S. Dhingra et al., Psychological Distress Severity of
Adults Reporting Receipt of Treatment for Mental Health Problems in the
BRFSS, 62 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 396, 397 (2011) (“Psychological,
psychopharmacological, and combination treatments . . . can lead to complete
and lasting remission, symptom reduction, and better psychosocial
functioning.”); Hans-Ulrich Wittchen et al., The Waxing and Waning of Mental
Disorders: Evaluating the Stability of Syndromes of Mental Disorders in the
Population, 41 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 122, 130 (2000) (“[S]ymptoms and
syndromes, as well as diagnoses, of mental disorders wax and wane over time.”).
27. NAMI, MENTAL ILLNESSES, supra note 24, at 1. For example, “[a]s of 2000,
depressive disorders alone were the fourth leading cause of disease burden
worldwide, accounting for 4.4 percent of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)
and 12 percent of all total years lived with disability in the world.” Chatterji et
al., supra note 23, at 2 (citation omitted). The disabling nature of mental illness
is due in part to the frequent co-morbidity of psychiatric disorders with other
psychiatric disorders and with medical conditions such as “chronic pain,
neurological disorders, circulatory disorders, and gynecological problems. About
45 percent of adults with any kind of psychiatric disorder in the past 12 months
have two or more psychiatric disorders.” Id. at 2 n.2 (citing Kessler et al., supra
note 23, at 619).
28. Linda A. Teplin et al., Crime Victimization in Adults with Severe Mental
Illness, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 911, 911 (2005); see also Michael
Menaster, Psychiatric Illness Associated with Criminality, MEDSCAPE (June 27,
2011), http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/294626-overview (“Nearly any
psychiatric symptom can be associated with criminality, because symptoms can
impair judgment and violate societal norms. . . . However, most individuals with
mental illness are not violent.”).
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justice approach.29 Instead of the typical judicial proceeding,
this approach allows criminal defendants to participate in a
mediation conference with the victims of their crimes.30
Ideally, offenders will acknowledge their involvement in the
crime to victims and other directly affected community
members and will express remorse for their behavior. If the
victim accepts this admission of responsibility, the parties
jointly devise a remedy that holds the offender accountable
and makes amends to the victim and other affected
individuals.31 Thus, the sanctions for the crime are
determined by those most affected by the crime, including
the offender, in the hope that this will facilitate reform in
the offender and recovery by the victim and the surrounding
community.32
Although restorative justice programs are widely
established and employed, an unresolved question is
whether these programs are successful with only a small,
select number of offenders or whether they can be
effectively applied to a wider range of individuals. This
Article addresses one sizeable group of criminal defendants,
namely, individuals with a mental disorder, for whom a
restorative justice approach at first glance might seem
inappropriate. It concludes, however, that many of these
offenders can be successfully encompassed within the
restorative justice paradigm.33 This Article will argue that a
restorative justice approach promotes the psychological
well-being of many of these offenders and their victims
without undermining the societal goals of the CJS. This
Article will also contend, however, that a key to its
successful application is the incorporation of the principles

29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. As will be discussed, participating offenders with a mental disorder must
possess sufficient understanding of the nature of their offense and its impact on
the victim, as well as the requisite interpersonal skills to engage in a
meaningful dialogue with the victim. In addition, victims may need to be
educated regarding the nature and impact of the offender‟s mental disorder, and
the participation of both parties must be informed and voluntary. See infra Part
VI.B.
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of procedural justice,34 which will enhance the willingness of
these offenders to participate and learn from their mistakes
to avoid repeating them in the future, as well as increase
victim participation and satisfaction with the outcome.
I. THE FOCUS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
RELATED MODELS OF PUNISHMENT
Criminal law, like the law in general, is a reflection of
the society that creates it.35 However, unlike other types of
law, criminal law is distinct in that it may be categorized as
public law.36 Although the immediate victim of a crime is
often a private party, crime is viewed as involving more
than a private injury. A crime causes “societal harm”
because the injury suffered involves “a breach and violation
of public rights and duties, due to the whole community,
considered as a community, in its social aggregate
capacity.”37
Consequently, the community relies on the State to
prosecute suspected wrongdoers so that offenders are
punished, incapacitated where necessary, and hopefully
rehabilitated or at least deterred from committing future
crime, while prospective potential offenders learn that
“crime doesn‟t pay” and victims gain a sense that justice has
34. Procedural justice emphasizes the importance of the perceived fairness of
the process employed in dispute resolution. For further discussion of the
procedural justice paradigm, see infra Part V.
35. Thomas L. Hafemeister & John Petrila, Treating the Mentally Disordered
Offender: Society‟s Uncertain, Conflicted, and Changing Views, 21 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 729, 731 (1994).
36. THOMAS J. GARDNER & TERRY M. ANDERSON, CRIMINAL LAW 6 (10th ed.
2009) (“In early England, crimes such as robbery, murder, and theft were
classified as private matters, which made victims responsible for remedying
their own problems. . . . Today, criminal law in England and the United States
is public law. Apprehension and prosecution of criminals are public matters.
Public law enforcement agencies, public prosecutors, courts, jails, and
correctional institutions make up the criminal justice systems . . . .”); Mary
Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 151 (2010) (“Punishment under law is a profound
exercise of state power.”).
37. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 1.01 (3d ed. 2001)
(citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5
(1769)).
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been done and equity restored.38 To accomplish this,
publicly-funded attorneys representing the community at
large prosecute crimes, not private individuals or private
counsel. Victims are distanced from the criminal process so
their feelings of anger, hurt, and outrage, not to mention a
desire for vengeance, do not discolor or subvert the
proceedings. Having the State pursue an offender and a jury
or judge, rather than the immediate victim, determine guilt
and assign sanctions is believed to limit subsequent spirals
of revenge and violence and enable the community to better
achieve and maintain tranquility and stability.39 Because of
society‟s interest in the criminal law, however, current
jurisprudential models of punishment tend to center on the
relationship between the offender and the community, with
little attention given to the impact of the crime on the
victim and any future interactions between the victim and
the offender.40
It is widely agreed that four models of punishment
predominate within today‟s CJS, namely, retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.41 The
retributive model argues for the infliction of penalties on
offenders because they “deserve” it for violating the
community‟s legal norms.42 Under this model, crime merits
punishment because it is morally fitting that persons
committing these acts should suffer in proportion to their
culpability.43
38. See id. § 2.01.
39. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 13, at 12 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing 1980) (1690) (“God hath certainly
appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men.”).
40. Erin C. Blondel, Victims‟ Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J.
237, 241 (2008) (explaining the fundamental differences between adversarial
and inquisitorial judicial systems and how the former focuses on procedure and
rules, not the offender‟s relationship to society).
41. Michele Cotton, Back With a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as
an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313,
1315 (2000).
42. R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Works in the Philosophy of
Punishment, in 20 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 25-27 (Michael
Tonry ed., 1996).
43. Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just”
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 859-60 (2002).
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The deterrence model presumes that human actors,
when choosing a course of conduct, perform a hedonistic
calculus of likely resulting pain and pleasure.44 If the “costs”
are too high, it is asserted, a rational person will choose not
to commit a crime.45 There are two variations of this model.
Under the general deterrence paradigm, potential offenders
are believed to be discouraged from criminal behavior when
they observe the consequences suffered by others who
commit crimes.46 Under the specific deterrence paradigm,
individuals who commit a criminal offense are thought to be
dissuaded from repeating their misconduct by the adverse
consequences they incurred as a result of their punishment
for the crime.47
Proponents of the incapacitation model assert that
society has the right and an obligation to protect its
members from harmful behavior by removing from its midst
persons considered dangerous because of their criminal
conduct.48 Incapacitation always “works” while offenders are
incarcerated because they are not able to commit new
offenses in the community during this time, although it may
have little salutary impact on their behavior after release.49
In contrast to these relatively pessimistic models of
punishment is the model of rehabilitation. Its supporters
44. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Society‟s Moral Right to Punish: A Further
Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 310
(1990).
45. See id.
46. Cotton, supra note 41, at 1316.
47. See id. Unlike retribution, deterrence specifically seeks to prevent or
reduce crime. See id. Whether punishment actually deters the general public
from criminal activity is unclear as conclusive empirical research supporting
this assertion is lacking and a number of factors are associated with a decision
to violate the law. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 29 (5th ed. 2010). It may
also be impossible to ascertain whether offenders are deterred from subsequent
criminal activity by the punishment they incur because, while high recidivism
rates following incarceration suggest a lack of deterrence, it cannot be
definitively ruled out that recidivism rates might have been higher without the
punishment. Id. at 29-30. At the same time, punishment may actually increase
criminal conduct as offenders may respond to punishment with anger and a
desire for revenge or become embedded within a criminal culture. Id. at 30.
48. John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for
Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660 (2000).
49. Id.
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contend that offenders should be provided access to
appropriate services and assistance so that they return to
society without the desire or need to commit further
crimes.50 This model rests on a belief that the causes of
criminal behavior can be identified and means employed to
improve the future behavior of the offender.51 Beginning in
the 1970s, support for the rehabilitative model waned,
driven by high recidivism rates and the perception that the
process of rehabilitation was practically and morally
complex and often unsuccessful.52 In recent years, however,
as discussed below, calls have been made to reenergize
efforts to rehabilitate criminal offenders,53 although finding
the resources for these efforts as traditionally formulated
remains a significant impediment.54
It is no coincidence that the more favored models of
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation, with their
emphasis on incarceration, have in recent years combined to
result in the imprisonment of more people in the United
States for the purpose of crime control than virtually any
other society in history.55 During the first seven decades of
the twentieth century, “the incarceration rate in the United
States consistently averaged 110 inmates for every 100,000
people.”56 In the 1970s this rate began to increase, and in
the 1980s and 1990s it grew exponentially.57 Between 2000
and 2009, the number of incarcerated offenders continued to
50. Cotton, supra note 41, at 1316.
51. LAFAVE, supra note 47, § 1.5(a)(3); Cotton, supra note 41, at 1316.
52. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1894 (1991).
53. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
54. Don Meyer, Op-Ed., Fix Probation to Fix Prisons, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 21,
2009), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-meyer21-2009jan21,0,73630
39.story; Suzanne Robson, Lack of Funding Ends Prison Rehabilitation
Program, PRESTON LEADER, Nov. 2, 2010, at 5.
55. DENNIS SULLIVAN & LARRY TIFFT, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HEALING
FOUNDATIONS OF OUR EVERYDAY LIVES 9 (2001).

THE

56. Id.
57. In 1980, the rate of incarceration in state and federal prison facilities was
139 per 100,000 persons in the population. By 1999, it had risen to 476 per
100,000 persons. See LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at
1 (2010).
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increase, although this growth was slower than in previous
decades.58 It is estimated that over two million (2,292,133)
individuals were incarcerated in U.S. prisons and jails in
2009, or approximately 743 of every 100,000 members of the
population.59
The result is the highest rate of incarceration in the
world60 and a crowded and over-extended correctional
system. Despite devoting substantial resources to the
building of new facilities, many prison and jail systems are
operating above their official housing capacity.61 In
California, the correctional census is so large that the U.S.
Supreme Court recently took the extraordinary step of
upholding an order to dramatically reduce the prison
population to remedy violations of prisoners‟ constitutional
rights caused by severe and pervasive overcrowding. 62
Moreover, the value of this extensive and expensive use of
incarceration
is
increasingly
being
questioned.63
58. Id. at 1.
59. World Prison Brief: United States of America, INT‟L CTR. FOR PRISON
STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country
=190 (last visited Dec. 17, 2011).
60. Entire World—Prison Population Rates per 100,000 of the National
Population, INT‟L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/
info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poprate (last visited Dec.
17, 2011). In contrast, the Czech Republic, with an incarceration rate of 220, has
the highest rate in the European Union. Id.
61. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2002, at 7 (rev. 2003); Michael B. Farrell,
Parole Holds Key to Prison Overcrowding, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 29,
2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2009/0929/p20s01-usgn.html; Solomon
Moore, States Export Their Inmates as Prisons Fill, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2007, at
A1; David G. Savage & Carol J. Williams, State Prison Crowding Case Heads to
Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1.
62. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923-24 (2011); see also Robert Barnes,
Justices Rebuke Calif. Prisons, WASH. POST, May 24, 2011, at A1 (“[The]
Supreme Court . . . ordered California to reduce its chronically overcrowded
prisons by more than 30,000 prisoners, saying judges must get involved when
prison conditions are „incompatible with the concept of human dignity.‟”); Adam
Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Tell California to Cut Prison Population, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 2011, at A1.
63. Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., In Prison Reform, Money Trumps Civil
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at WK9; Sunil Dutta, Op-Ed., How to Fix
America‟s Broken Criminal Justice System, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 30,
2010),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/1230/How-to-fix-
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Incarcerated individuals show a startling rate of recidivism
upon release, with more than four in ten returning to prison
within three years of their release.64
While the retributive, deterrent, and incapacitation
models have tended to be the dominant approaches
undergirding punishment policy in recent years, the
resulting increase in incarceration and persistently high
recidivism rates have led some to call for a return to a
greater
emphasis
on
the
rehabilitative
model.65
Commentators argue that rehabilitation remains a crucial
element of the CJS66 and have observed that even prison
officials continue to call for rehabilitation programs.67
America-s-broken-criminal-justice-system; Adam Liptak, More than 1 in 100
Adults Are Now in Prison in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at A14; Adam
Skolnick, Runaway Prison Costs Trash State Budgets, FISCAL TIMES (Feb. 9,
2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/02/09/Runaway-Prison-Costs
-Thrash-State-Budgets.aspx; Jennifer Steinhauer, To Trim Costs, States Relax
Hard Line on Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at A1; Krissah Thompson,
Prison Reform Advocates Press States to Shift Money Out of Corrections System,
WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/prisonreform-advocates-press-states-to-shift-money-out-of-corrections-system/2011/04/
04/AFeCXolC_story.html.
64. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF
AMERICA‟S PRISONS 2 (2011), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/
uploadedFiles/Pew_State_of_Recidivism.pdf (“45.4 percent of people released
from prison in 1999 and 43.3 percent of those sent home in 2004 were
reincarcerated within three years, either for committing a new crime or for
violating conditions governing their release. . . . [R]ecidivism rates between 1994
and 2007 have consistently remained around 40 percent.”); see also BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 2001, at 506 tbl.6.42 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2002)
(finding, in fifteen-state survey, that 29.9% of inmates released from state
prisons were rearrested within six months of release and 67.5% of them were
rearrested within three years).
65. Richard S. Gebelein, Delaware Leads the Nation: Rehabilitation in a Law
and Order Society; A System Responds to Punitive Rhetoric, 7 DEL. L. REV. 1, 1
(2004); Developments in the Law—The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1114, 1175 (2008).
66. Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17, 73
(2003) (“[T]he goal of rehabilitation remains an essential means of organizing
and structuring a modern prison. . . . [V]irtually all large prisons offer
vocational and academic training of some sort.”).
67. Id.; see also PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 64, at 8 (“Catching the
guy and prosecuting him is really important work, but if we don‟t do anything
with that individual after we‟ve got him, then shame on us. If . . . we just open
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Others have sought to undermine the assertion that
rehabilitative programs are ineffective, arguing that
rehabilitation can, when implemented correctly, decrease
recidivism.68 One notable manifestation of the movement
towards reimplementation of a rehabilitative approach,
prompted by frustration with current practices in the CJS,
is the growth of problem-solving courts that seek to address
the underlying causes of criminal behavior and thereby
negate the need for incarceration.69 As will be discussed
below, the growing popularity of these courts is notable,
with such courts having become pervasive in the past two
decades and now located in all fifty states.70
In recent years, increasing attention has also been given
to the deleterious impact of the predominant CJS approach
the doors five years later, and it‟s the same guy walking out the door and the
same criminal thinking, we‟ve failed in our mission.” (quoting Minnesota
Commissioner of Corrections Tom Roy, Apr. 7, 2011)). Correctional officials have
also recognized that providing needed programs and resources to inmates with a
mental illness can have a significant impact on the recidivism rate. Chi-Chi
Zhang, Study: Utah Inmate Recidivism Rates Drop, DESERET NEWS (Apr. 17,
2011), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700128069/Study-Utah-inmate-recidi
vism-rates-drop.html (“Jean Nielsen, director of Salt Lake County‟s Department
of Human Services, credits Utah‟s improvement over the years to an increase in
substance abuse programs and resources that help the mentally ill. . . . „With
education, training, substance abuse programs, various treatment, housing
options, and counseling, we want to ensure they have a smooth transition back
into society and don‟t go back to jail.‟”).
68. See ANN CHIH LIN, REFORM IN THE MAKING: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN PRISON 25-30 (2000); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 64,
at 6 (quoting Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related
Agencies, Committee on Appropriations chair U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf, Jan. 8,
2011); Ted Palmer, The Effectiveness of Intervention: Recent Trends and Current
Issues, 37 CRIME & DELINQ. 330, 330-32 (1991). See generally Francis T. Cullen
& Paul Gendreau, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation:
Reconsidering the “Nothing Works” Debate, in THE AMERICAN PRISON: ISSUES IN
RESEARCH AND POLICY 23, 23-44 (Lynne Goodstein & Doris Layton MacKenzie
eds., 1989) (reviewing research demonstrating the success of rehabilitation
programs).
69. James L. Nolan Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the
Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1541-43 (2003); see also Michael
Daly Hawkins, Coming Home: Accommodating the Special Needs of Military
Veterans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 571 (2010)
(noting specialized court programs for veterans are “becoming a fixture of many
state criminal justice systems”).
70. See infra Part III.B-C.
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on the victims of crime.71 Notwithstanding that these
victims number in the millions,72 and that they frequently
know the offender well,73 studies indicate their ability to
play a significant role in or to guide the processing of the
cases germane to them is limited; prosecutors often fail to
inform and consult with them regarding these cases; and
the CJS gives inadequate attention to the emotional and
material harm they experience.74 Such findings are of
concern, given that commentators have widely noted the
importance of involving victims more directly in criminal
justice proceedings and responding to their needs.75
71. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS‟ RIGHTS
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995) (examining the victimization of the victims of a
criminal act in a series of high profile trials); Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental
Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention, 16 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS
159, 159-60, 162-63 (2003).
IN

72. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2009, at 1 (2010) (“In 2009, U.S.
residents age 12 or older experienced an estimated 20 million
[crimes] . . . .”).
OF

73. Id. at 7 (“Victims knew the offenders in 45% of violent crimes against men
and 68% of violent crimes against women in 2009[.]”).
74. Heather Strang & Lawrence Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 18.
75. Aileen Adams & David Osborne, Victims‟ Rights and Services: A
Historical Perspective and Goals for the Twenty-First Century, 33 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 673, 674-78 (2002); Victor Hugo-Schulze, Out in the Cold No Longer: A
Primer on Victims‟ Rights, 9 NEVADA LAW., no. 4, Apr. 2001 at 14, 14; William T.
Pizzi, Victims‟ Rights: Rethinking Our “Adversary System,” 1999 UTAH L. REV.
349, 352-53; Strang & Sherman, supra note 74, at 16-25. A frequent assertion of
commentators pushing for greater recognition of victims‟ “rights” in these
proceedings is that their exclusion or limited role is unjust because they have
significant interests in the outcome that should be heard and respected. They
also argue that increased victim involvement will enhance the willingness of
victims to support and provide needed testimony, as well as lead to greater
satisfaction with case dispositions and the CJS generally. See Peggy M.
Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years
After the President‟s Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 21, 101-05 (1999) (discussing expectations, concerns, and
empirical findings associated with increased victim participation in the CJS);
see also PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 8-9
(2d ed. 2010) (outlining victim rights during judicial proceedings and remedies
for victims‟ rights violations); Steven Joffee, Note, Validating Victims: Enforcing
Victims‟ Rights Through Mandatory Mandamus, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 241, 242-45
(examining the movement for a greater recognition of criminal victims‟ rights).
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II. JAILS AND PRISONS: AMERICA‟S DE FACTO MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM
While more and more offenders have been imprisoned,
jails and prisons have also become, by default, America‟s de
facto mental health system.76 This occurrence is the result of
a dramatic shift in medical and legal policy in the United
States. Historically, large state-funded psychiatric facilities
were the primary locus of care for individuals with a serious
mental disorder, or at least for those who lacked the
resources to access other more preferable sources of care. 77
Beginning in the 1950s, the availability of new antipsychotic medications enabled some individuals with a
mental disorder to function better in the community and
thereby avoid placement in these institutional settings.78
Other factors that drove a decline in the population and the
closing of many state mental health facilities included:
financial constraints faced by many states that reduced
their ability to support these facilities;79 the enactment of
Medicaid and Medicare, which made some support for
community care available but limited the use of federal

76. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 16; E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE
SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA‟S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 25-42 (1997); E.
Fuller Torrey, Editorial, Jails and Prisons—America‟s New Mental Hospitals, 85
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1611, 1611 (1995); Fox Butterfield, Study Finds Hundreds
of Thousands of Inmates Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at A14. In
addition, police are often characterized as the front-line respondents to people
with severe mental illnesses experiencing crises in the community. See Where
We Stand—The Criminalization of People with Mental Illness, NAT‟L ALLIANCE
ON
MENTAL ILLNESS, http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Policy/
WhereWeStand/The_Criminalization_of_People_with_Mental_Illness___WHER
E_WE_STAND.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2011) [hereinafter NAMI,
Criminalization].
77. H. Richard Lamb et al., Mentally Ill Persons in the Criminal Justice
System: Some Perspectives, 75 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 107, 109 (2004).
78. PHIL
BROWN,
THE
TRANSFER
OF
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 39 (1985).

CARE:

PSYCHIATRIC

79. PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE
LIMITS OF CHANGE 50-51 (1994); BROWN, supra note 78, at 39-40; see also Ronald
L. Wisor Jr., Community Care, Competition and Coercion: A Legal Perspective
on Privatized Mental Health Care, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 149 (1993) (noting
that the imposition of minimum requirements became fiscally impossible in
many locations, resulting in release of residents).
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funds to support these large facilities;80 increases in the
costs of operating these facilities, including the need to pay
staff higher wages;81 and a series of exposés82 and lawsuits83
challenging the quality of the services provided in these
facilities and the lax criteria for admission.
At the peak of the state hospital system in the mid1950s, the census of individuals receiving care in these
facilities reached 559,000.84 “From 1960 to 1980, this
number plunged to less than 100,000.”85 Currently, there
are as few as 40,000 persons residing in state psychiatric
facilities.86 This reduction was also motivated by a widely
80. RICHARD G. FRANK & SHERRY A. GLIED, BETTER BUT NOT WELL: MENTAL
HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1950, at 50-51, 54 (2006); William
Gronfein, Incentives and Intentions in Mental Health Policy: A Comparison of
the Medicaid and Community Mental Health Programs, 26 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV.
192
(1985);
David
Mechanic
&
David
A.
Rochefort,
Deinstitutionalization: An Appraisal of Reform, 16 ANN. REV. SOC. 301, 305, 309,
311 (1990).
81. See Stephen M. Rose, Deciphering Deinstitutionalization: Complexities in
Policy and Program Analysis, 57 MILBANK Q. 429, 446-49 (1979) (discussing
relative costs to states of hospitalization versus community health care (citing
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RETURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED TO THE
COMMUNITY: GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO DO MORE (1977))); Richard G. Frank, A
Model of State Expenditures on Mental Hospital Services, 13 PUB. FIN. Q. 319,
319 (1985).
82. FRANK & GLIED, supra note 80, at 1, 52-53, 59 (2006) (discussing court
cases regarding standards of care, as well as the exposé by Albert Deutsch,
entitled The Shame of the States, describing “how people with severe mental
illness languished in the filthy back wards of public mental hospitals”); DAVID J.
ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 15-44 (1984); Ralph
Slovenko, The Transinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
641, 644-51 (2003).
83. See O‟Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding that
individuals with a mental disorder cannot be involuntarily hospitalized if they
are not “dangerous” and can survive safely in the community); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (holding that states could not
deprive persons with a mental illness of liberty through involuntary
commitment without providing individual treatment that would give them “a
realistic opportunity to be cured”).
84. Lamb et al., supra note 77, at 109.
85. RISDON N. SLATE & W. WESLEY JOHNSON, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL
ILLNESS: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 27 (2008) (citation
omitted).
86. Id. Indeed, such facilities continue to be scheduled for closure. See Tom
Rowan Jr., Chris Christie Says Hagedorn Psychiatric Hospital Will Close in
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held belief that this population would be better served by
providing them access to community mental health
programs instead.87 However, funding for such programs
either did not materialize or has been quite limited, leaving
individuals with a mental disorder in the community
oftentimes at risk of psychological deterioration, which in
turn can lead to aberrant behavior, subsequent contact with
law enforcement officials, and arrest.88 The continuing
shortfalls in the existing community mental health system
were recently documented by a report that the states
cumulatively cut more than $1.8 billion from their budgets
for services for children and adults living with a mental
illness between 2009 and 2011, with ten states (including
California and Illinois) cutting their mental health
expenditures by 15% or more.89
Moreover, in response to increases in the levels of street
crime around the turn of the century, many public officials
became less tolerant of both the homeless and individuals
2012,
EXPRESS-TIMES
(July
2,
2011),
http://www.lehigh
valleylive.com/hunterdon-county/express-times/index.ssf/2011/07/chris_christie_
to_close_hagedo/5508/comments.html.
87. SLATE & JOHNSON, supra note 85, at 27. By the 1960s, the prevailing view
came to be that minimal institutionalization benefitted individual patients,
saved money, and placed accountability for care more appropriately in the
hands of local authorities. ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH
ABOUT DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 53-106 (1990) (providing a critique of these
rationales for deinstitutionalization). In 1963, Congress passed the Community
Mental Health Act, and, over the following years, tens of thousands of patients
were released from hospitals ostensibly to receive community care. See Mental
Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act
of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282, repealed by Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 902(e)(2)(B), 95 Stat. 357, 560.
Sadly, as discussed in the text, this community care was and is often not
forthcoming. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
88. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 20-21; NAMI, Criminalization,
supra note 76, at 1; Jennifer Hodulik, Comment, The Drug Court Model as a
Response to “Broken Windows:” Criminal Justice for the Homeless Mentally Ill,
91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1073, 1076 (2001).
89. See RON HONBERG ET AL., NAT‟L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, STATE
MENTAL HEALTH CUTS: A NATIONAL CRISIS 3 (2011); see also Kristen Wyatt, State
Budget Cuts Decimate Mental Health Services, ASSOC. PRESS (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://www.mh.alabama.gov/Downloads/COPI/NewsArticles/WSFA030911.pdf
(“32 states and Washington, D.C., cut funding just as economic stressors such as
layoffs and home foreclosures boosted demand for services. . . . In many states,
the picture is likely to get uglier.”).
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with mental disorders living in the community. For
example, Rudolph Giuliani, mayor of New York City from
1993 to 2002, ushered in a new policy known as the “Broken
Windows” approach to crime control.90 This approach,
proposed by James Wilson and George Kelling in an
Atlantic Monthly article,91 contends that allowing indicators
of disorder, such as broken windows and relatively minor
offenses, to remain unaddressed demonstrates a loss of
public order and control, which in turn breeds more serious
criminal activity.92 Because the presence of the homeless
was viewed as an indication of this disorder, efforts were
made to remove them from the streets. This was
accomplished in part by arresting and jailing them for
arguably petty violations of public ordinances such as
“begging, sleeping, camping, sitting, lying down, loitering,
or obstructing pedestrian traffic in public places.”93 As a
significant percentage of the homeless have a mental
disorder,94 many of these incarcerated individuals had
significant mental health impairments.95
90. Hodulik, supra note 88, at 1076.
91. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
92. Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence
from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271,
271 (2006); Hodulik, supra note 88, at 1076. Although widely employed, this
premise and its empirical foundation have drawn considerable criticism in
recent years. See FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING 2 (Wesley Skogan &
Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004); RALPH TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN
WINDOWS 21-23 (2000).
93. Hodulik, supra note 88, at 1076 (quoting Maria Foscanaris et al., Out of
Sight—Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend Toward the Criminalization of
Homelessness, 6 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL‟Y 145, 147 (1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
94. Id. at 1073; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 21 (“[O]ne in
twenty persons with a severe mental illness is homeless . . . from 20 to 33
percent of the homeless have serious mental illnesses.”).
95. Prison inmates with a mental disorder were more than twice as likely as
other inmates to have been homeless in the twelve months prior to arrest (20%
vs. 9%). PAULA M. DITTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH AND
TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 1 (1999), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf; see also Dale E. McNiel et al.,
Incarceration Associated with Homelessness, Mental Disorder, and Co-occurring
Substance Abuse, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 840, 844 (2005) (noting that people
who were homeless and had a mental disorder accounted for a substantial
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Similarly, efforts to crack down on substance abuse
during the so-called “War on Drugs” of the mid-1980s and
early 1990s also inadvertently increased the number of
individuals with a mental disorder entering the CJS.96
Because many persons with a mental disorder have a cooccurring substance abuse disorder,97 these efforts led to
increased arrests for drug offenses of individuals who had a
mental disorder.98 In one study, researchers found that over
a three-year period, 83% of individuals with co-concurring
mental illness and substance abuse disorders had contact
with the CJS and 44% were arrested on at least one
occasion.99
These changes have led to a considerable increase in the
incarceration of persons with a mental disorder. 100 It has
been estimated that between 200,000 and 300,000 inmates
in U.S. prisons suffer from a mental disorder and 70,000
inmates are experiencing a psychosis on any given day.101
portion of persons incarcerated in San Francisco despite representing only a
small proportion of the total population).
96. JOHN S. GOLDKAMP & CHERYL IRONS-GUYNN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE
CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE,
SAN
BERNARDINO,
AND
ANCHORAGE
2
(2000),
available
at
http://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182504.pdf.
97. SURGEON GENERAL‟S REPORT, supra note 2, at 15 (“Approximately 15
percent of all adults who have a mental disorder . . . also experience a cooccurring substance (alcohol or other drug) use disorder . . . .”); Karen M. Abram
& Linda A. Teplin, Co-Occurring Disorders Among Mentally Ill Jail Detainees:
Implications for Public Policy, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1036, 1036 (1991).
98. DITTON, supra note 95, at 4 (indicating that 15.2% of inmates with a
mental illness in a local jail, 12.8% of inmates with a mental illness in state
prison, and 40.4% of inmates with a mental illness in federal prison were
incarcerated for a drug offense).
99. Robin E. Clark et al., Legal System Involvement and Costs for Persons in
Treatment for Severe Mental Illness and Substance Use Disorders, 50
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 641, 646 n.1 & tbl.3 (1999).
100. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 23.
101. Id. at 1. These numbers were largely based on a review by the American
Psychiatric Association in 2000 that concluded that as many as one in five
prisoners are seriously mentally ill, with up to 5% of the prison population
actively psychotic at any given time. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS‟N, PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS, at xix (2d ed. 2000). Another review of available
research concluded that 8% to 19% of prisoners have significant psychiatric or
functional disabilities and another 15% to 20% will need some form of
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Focusing on admissions to local jails, it was recently
determined that the rate of current serious mental illness
for jail inmates is 14.5% for males and 31.0% for females,
with the authors of this study concluding that “there were
about two million (2,161,705) annual bookings of persons
with serious mental illnesses into jails.”102 In addition, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics has determined that more than
half of all prison and jail inmates have mental health
problems.103 Further, a member of the House Subcommittee
on Crime told his colleagues that, based on a report by the
National Alliance on Mental Illness, between 25% and 40%
of all Americans with a mental illness at some point in their
lives become entangled in the CJS.104 Not surprisingly,
research has shown that there are “three times more
mentally ill people in prisons than in mental health
hospitals, and that prisoners have rates of mental illness
that are two to four times greater than the rates of
members of the general public.”105 The 2000 Census of state
psychiatric intervention during incarceration. Jeffrey L. Metzner et al.,
Treatment in Jails and Prisons, in TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
DISORDERS 211, 211 (Robert M. Wettstein ed., 1998). Similarly, the Federal
Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that at midyear 1998, 283,800 offenders
with a mental illness were incarcerated in American prisons and jails, with 16%
of state prison inmates, 7% of federal inmates, and 16% of inmates in local jails
reporting either a psychiatric condition or an overnight stay in a mental
hospital. DITTON, supra note 95, at 1. Furthermore, approximately 61% of the
inmates with a mental illness in state prison, approximately 60% of inmates in
federal prison, and approximately 41% of inmates in local jails had required
mental health services since admission. Id. at 9.
102. Henry J. Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among
Jail Inmates, 60 PSYCH. SERVICES 761, 764 (2009). Serious mental illness was
defined as “major depressive disorder; depressive disorder not otherwise
specified; bipolar disorder I, II, and not otherwise specified; schizophrenia
spectrum disorder; schizoaffective disorder; schizophreniform disorder; brief
psychotic disorder; delusional disorder; and psychotic disorder not otherwise
specified.” Id. at 761.
103. BJS REPORT, supra note 7, at 1 (noting that at mid-year 2005, 705,600
inmates in state prisons, 70,200 inmates in Federal prisons, and 479,000 in local
jails reported either a recent history of mental illness or experiencing symptoms
of a mental health problem during the previous twelve months).
104. Mental Health Early Intervention, Treatment, and Prevention Act of
2000, S. 2639, 106th Cong. § 2(2) (2000); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at
18.
105. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 1. Another report concluded that
the number of Americans with serious mental illnesses in prison was four times
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and federal prisons reported that the “primary . . . or
secondary function” of 150 prisons nationwide is “mental
health confinement.”106 Indeed, the Cook County and Los
Angeles County jails, which provide entry points into the
prison systems of Illinois and California, are widely referred
to as two of the largest “mental health” facilities in the
country.107
Until the mid-1800s and the wide-spread establishment
of state-operated mental health facilities, it was common
practice to jail individuals with a mental illness.108 It seems
we have regressed to this practice. In addition, correctional
facilities have frequently proven inadequate to meet the
needs of these individuals,109 although this is perhaps not
surprising in that they were established for a very different
purpose.
For example, studies have shown that inmates with a
mental illness are more vulnerable to physical assault and
exploitation while incarcerated and more likely to have been
charged with breaking facility rules than other inmates.110
greater than in the general public. THE PRESIDENT‟S NEW FREEDOM COMM‟N ON
MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 17, at 32. The National Commission on
Correctional Health Care issued a report to Congress in April 2002 in which it
provided estimates of the prevalence of seven psychiatric disorders among jail
inmates and state and federal prison inmates, with the prevalence rates for
state prison inmates generally the highest and jail inmates generally the lowest.
NAT‟L COMM‟N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, 2 THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BERELEASED INMATES 59, 64 (2002) (using 1995 data).
106. ALLEN J. BECK & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS 4 (2001),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtsp00.pdf.
107. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 16, 17 n.9 (internal
citation omitted) (noting on any given day the Los Angeles County Jail holds as
many as 3,300 inmates with a serious mental illness and the Cook County Jail
has over 1,000 prisoners in mental health treatment).
108. APPELBAUM, supra note 79, at 19.
109. Hodulik, supra note 88, at 1083.
110. See BJS REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (reporting that State prisoners with
a mental illness were twice as likely to have been injured in a fight since
admission as those without mental health problems); DITTON, supra note 95, at
10 (finding higher rates of discipline for inmates with a mental illness ); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 56-58; see also Mary Beth Pfeiffer, Cruel and
Usual Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2006, § 14LI (Magazine), at 17
(describing treatment of inmates with a mental illness in New York State

174

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

One commentator writes of the difficulties awaiting inmates
with a mental illness housed in jails and prisons:
Correctional institutions have rigid formal rules and even more
subtle informal rules both institutionally and within the inmate
population itself. Mentally ill inmates often cannot comprehend
these rules. If there ever was a place where horrific paranoid
delusions might really come true, it is in a prison. Mentally ill
prisoners are not only inherently vulnerable to abuse, but they are
also often provocatively irritating and offensive to other prisoners
and prison guards. Yelling, removing clothes, throwing food,
setting fires . . . to drive demons out of the cell . . . are not unusual
behaviors for them. Attacks, rapes and dominating relationships
are often regular plights of mentally ill prisoners. Suicide is also a
111
more common problem.

In addition to providing a potentially harmful
environment for persons with a mental illness, jails and
prisons are also often ill equipped to provide them with
needed treatment.112 In 2003, President George W. Bush
created the New Freedom Commission on Mental Health,
which subsequently reported that persons with a mental
illness who are jailed are “likely to continually recycle
prisons, including frequent use of solitary confinement as punishment for
behavior associated with the symptoms of mental disorders).
111. Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are Brim Full of the Mentally Ill: Is Their
Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 157,
183-84 (2000); see also TORREY, supra note 76, at 31 (“Being in jail or prison
when your brain is playing tricks on you is often brutal.”); id. at 34 (“Jails and
prisons usually exacerbate psychiatric symptoms . . . .”); Eve Bender, Prison
Punishment Exacerbates Inmates‟ Psychiatric Illness, 40 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, no.
15, Nov. 2005 at 15, 15 (“In people with serious mental illness, spending time in
[segregated housing units] exacerbates symptoms and can lead to psychotic
decompensation or suicidality [effectively creating] the most severely psychotic
people [mental health professionals] have seen in more than 25 years . . . .”);
NAMI, Criminalization, supra note 76, at 1 (“Conditions in jails and prisons are
often terrifying for people with severe mental illnesses.”).
112. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 194-95; Risdon N. Slate, From the
Jailhouse to Capitol Hill: Impacting Mental Health Court Legislation and
Defining What Constitutes a Mental Health Court, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 6, 14
(2003) (“[I]n excess of 20 percent of jails provide no formal access to mental
health treatment . . . .”); see also W. David Ball, Mentally Ill Prisoners in the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: Strategies for
Improving Treatment and Reducing Recidivism, 24 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL‟Y 1, 7 (2007) (highlighting limitations to treatment in California jails and
prisons).
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through the mental health, substance abuse, and criminal
justice systems,” in part because they “frequently do not
receive appropriate mental health services [while they are
in jail].”113 For example, one study found that, on average,
only 80% of state prisoners who needed structured
counseling received it, while under 60% of those who need
psychotropic medications received them.114 Furthermore,
because jails and prisons are intended to administer
punishment and protect society, their primary mission does
not encompass the delivery of mental health services and,
indeed, this is often antithetical to what staff perceives to be
their primary responsibility.115 The U.S. Supreme Court in
its recent ruling dictating that California reduce its prison
population focused much of its opinion on the inadequate
mental health care being provided these inmates, which it
determined reached the level of a Constitutional violation.116
Even when appropriate treatment is provided in the
course of incarceration, the individual‟s status upon release
as both a former inmate and a person in need of mental
health services results in a double stigmatization that
makes obtaining treatment in the community—even when
that treatment is available, which it often is not—
particularly difficult.117 Further, even a minor conviction
113. THE PRESIDENT‟S NEW FREEDOM COMM‟N
17, at 32.

ON

MENTAL HEALTH, supra note

114. Wendy Pogorzelski et al., Behavioral Health Problems, Ex-Offender
Reentry Policies, and the “Second Chance Act,” 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1718,
1719 (2005) (“On average, 1 in 8 state prisoners is engaged in structured
counseling (about 80% of the estimated number needing it) and 1 in 10 is
receiving psychotropic medications (nearly 60% of the estimated number
needing them).” (citing BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 106, at 1)).
115. H. Richard Lamb, Op-Ed., Reversing Criminalization, 166 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 8, 8 (2009).
116. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1932-33 (2011). The record indicated that
vacancy rates for psychiatrists ranged as high as 54%, and that even if fully
staffed officials would be unable to meet inmates‟ mental health needs because
of overcrowding. Id. at 1932. Furthermore, a prison psychiatrist reported that
staff were doing about 50% of what they should be doing. Id. Lack of resources
led to significant delays in treatment and the housing of inmates with a mental
illness in administrative segregation for up to six months, including placements
in “tiny phone-booth sized cages.” Id. at 1933. In addition, prisoners committed
suicide while awaiting transfer to a treatment unit. Id.
117. Lamb, supra note 115, at 8; NAMI, Criminalization, supra note 76, at 1
(“Federal and state prisons generally do not have adequate rehabilitative
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labels an individual with a mental illness as a criminal, a
designation that may limit housing and employment
opportunities and adversely color future encounters with
police and adjudicative decisions.118 As a result, offenders
with a mental illness tend to pass through a “revolving
door” where they are removed from the community for a
criminal offense, incarcerated, returned to the streets, and
then arrested and imprisoned again when their
unaddressed mental health problems contribute to
violations of society‟s norms.119

services available for inmates with severe mental illnesses to aid them in their
transition back into communities.”). For an examination of how criminal
convictions limit mental health treatment within the community, see
Pogorzelski et al., supra note 114, at 1721-23. For a discussion of the increasing
shortages in these services, see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
118. H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, The Shift of Psychiatric
Inpatient Care from Hospitals to Jails and Prisons, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 529, 531 (2005).
119. DITTON, supra note 95, at 1 (“Over three-quarters of mentally ill inmates
had been sentenced to time in prison or jail or [placed] on probation at least once
prior to the current sentence.”); id. at 5 (noting 54% of jail inmates, 52% of state
prisoners, and 49% of federal prisoners with a mental illness reported three or
more prior criminal sentences); GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 22;
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 193 (stating in New York and Ohio
studies, 64% and 63%, respectively, of mentally ill offenders were rearrested
within eighteen months; in a Tennessee study, 39% of prisoners with mental
health diagnoses were back in the correctional system within twelve months of
discharge); LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health
Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill
Offenders, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 373, 374 (2000); Marlee E. Moore & Virginia
Aldigé Hiday, Mental Health Court Outcomes: A Comparison of Re-Arrest and
Re-Arrest Severity Between Mental Health Court and Traditional Court
Participants, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660 (2006).
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III. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES120
Critics of the frequent incarceration of persons with a
mental illness have observed that this imprisonment has
not been offset by public safety or deterrence benefits. 121
Further, because prisons and jails are often a harmful
environment for individuals with a mental disorder and
may be largely ineffective in responding to their mental
health needs or reducing their likelihood of recidivism,122
attention has turned to identifying diversion programs for
this population.123 Police, jail and prison officials, judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, human rights advocates,
advocates for individuals with a mental illness, and mental
health officials and professionals have all agreed that
incarceration is generally not an appropriate placement for
120. The discussion that follows focuses on diversion programs that can be
employed once an individual with a mental disorder has been arrested and
criminal justice proceedings initiated. Other fruitful alternatives could
commence at an earlier point in time. For example, efforts could be made to
prevent such individuals from running afoul of the CJS in the first place by
increasing the availability of community mental health services or targeting
such services for individuals who have shown a proclivity or likelihood to be
arrested. Additionally, attention could be given to enhancing diversion after a
police officer has responded to a report of a criminal offense but before the
formal criminal justice process is commenced. See H. Richard Lamb & Leona L.
Bachrach, Some Perspectives on Deinstitutionalization, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES
1039, 1042 (2001) (noting a range of such strategies, including “mental health
consultations to police officers in the field, formal training of police officers,
careful screening of incoming jail detainees, and diversion to the mental health
system of mentally ill persons who have committed minor offenses”).
121. See, e.g., Amanda Pustilnik, Prisons of the Mind: Social Value and
Economic Inefficiency in the Criminal Justice Response to Mental Illness, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 217, 219 (2006) (“General deterrence . . . and specific
deterrence . . . certainly cannot be promoted by incarcerating people who have
not committed a crime. Similarly, public safety is not advanced by confining
people who are nonoffending or whose offenses of conviction are nonviolent.
Even as to violent mentally ill lawbreakers, public safety may be better served
by detention in secure hospitals, as many prison systems transfer their violent
mentally ill inmates to hospitals in any event.”).
122. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT‟S NEW FREEDOM COMM‟N ON MENTAL HEALTH,
supra note 17, at 43 (“It is important to keep adults and youth with serious
mental illnesses who are not criminals out of the criminal justice system. . . .
With appropriate diversion and re-entry programs, these consumers could be
successfully living in and contributing to their communities.”).
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an offender with a mental disorder, particularly if it is a
severe mental illness.124 In response, a number of
alternatives to incarceration have been explored that might
better address individuals with a mental disorder who have
committed a crime.
A. Probation
A traditional alternative in lieu of incarceration is to
place individuals who have committed a relatively minor
crime on probation for a period of time, with the offenders
required to meet various conditions of probation to maintain
their freedom.125 An offender with a mental disorder could
be required to obtain mental health treatment or take other
steps (e.g., submit to periodic drug testing) as a condition of
probation.126
A study by the Federal Bureau of Justice Statistics
found, however, that although 13% of probationers were
required to seek mental health treatment as a condition of
release into the community, only 43% of them had
participated in treatment as required.127 Another study
found that the rates of rearrest for probationers with a
mental illness (54%) were nearly double that of probationers
without a mental illness (30%).128
124. Butterfield, supra note 76.
125. See GLAZE, supra note 57, at 2 (“The majority (70%) of offenders under
correctional supervision at yearend 2009 were supervised in the community
(5,018,900) either on probation or parole, remaining relatively unchanged since
2000 (71%).”); LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES,
2009, at 1 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus09.pdf
(“Probation is a court-ordered period of correctional supervision in the
community, generally as an alternative to incarceration. In some cases,
probation can be a combined sentence of incarceration followed by a period of
community supervision.”).
126. DITTON, supra note 95, at 3 (“Of those on probation at year end 1998, an
estimated 547,800 were mentally ill.”); see also Jennifer L. Skeem et al.,
Probation, Mental Health, and Mandated Treatment: A National Survey, 33
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 158, 158 (2006) (providing a national survey of
supervision approaches of mental health and traditional probation agencies).
127. DITTON, supra note 95, at 9.
128. Skeem et al., supra note 126, at 160 (citing Lorena Lee Dauphinot, The
Efficacy of Community Correctional Supervision for Offenders with Severe

2012]

FORGING LINKS AND RENEWING TIES

179

Part of the problem with this approach is that it
necessitates a level of expertise regarding mental disorders
and how best to respond to them, and the opportunity and
ability to identify and appraise the effectiveness of mental
health programs that most probation officers do not have.129
Even if they have this expertise, because the case load of
probation officers is generally quite large, they will rarely
have the time required to provide needed intensive case
services to this population.130 It has been noted:
Like other criminal justice institutions, probation agencies were
not designed to meet the unique challenges of individuals with
serious mental illness. Probationers with mental illness (PMIs)
often have pronounced needs for precious social resources that
include housing, entitlements, and transportation. When their
functioning is limited, PMIs may have difficulty meeting standard
conditions of probation (e.g., paying fees, maintaining
employment). Moreover, PMIs are likely to be mandated to
participate in mental health treatment as a special condition of
probation. Such conditions obligate the probation officer (PO) to
implement treatment mandates, often in complex and
overburdened mental health care systems. Although monitoring
and enforcing treatment compliance is viewed as the POs‟ primary
task in supervising PMIs, there are few guidelines for doing so.
These disjunctures between PMIs‟ needs and basic operating
procedures in probation agencies may help explain PMIs‟
131
relatively high risk of failure.

Some jurisdictions have attempted to meet these
challenges by establishing specialized probation programs

Mental Illness (Aug. 1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas
at Austin)).
129. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV‟TS, supra note 4, at 121 (“A common frustration for
courts is to identify a person with mental health needs, consult its inventory of
programs, and be unable to find a program that, because of the person‟s charge,
treatment history, or lack of insurance, is willing to accept the person.”).
130. Skeem et al., supra note 126, at 158-59 (“Recently, the number of people
under correctional supervision reached an all-time high of more than 6.7 million
individuals. Given that the majority (60%) of these individuals are supervised in
the community by probation officers, the burgeoning correctional population
places an unprecedented strain on probation agencies. This strain is intensified
by the serious mental health and substance abuse problems that an increasing
proportion of these probationers experience.” (citations omitted)).
131. Id. at 160 (citations omitted).
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for this population.132 However, a national survey of these
programs identified a number of associated limitations,
including large caseloads, mixed caseloads that diffuse
focus, probation officers lacking mental health expertise or
training, a failure to actively integrate internal and
external resources to meet probationers‟ needs, and an
inability to maintain treatment compliance and a lack of
related problem-solving strategies.133 It also may not be
possible to maintain these relatively costly programs as the
criminal justice system in general and the probation system
in particular come under increased scrutiny and fiscal
pressure.134 Finally, this approach only addresses part of the
equation as it does not address the related needs of the
victims of these offenses, provide offenders with an
opportunity or encouragement to accept responsibility for
their criminal acts, or enable either victims or offenders to
actively participate in shaping the response to the
precipitating mental health problems and resulting criminal
behavior.135
132. Id.; see also COUNCIL OF STATE GOV‟TS, supra note 4, at 121-22
(recommending that probation agencies assign probationers with “mental health
conditions” to probation officers with “specialized training and small caseloads”).
133. See Skeem et al., supra note 126, at 160-83.
134. See David Reynolds, NC Probation Officers Overloaded as Caseloads
Grow, STAR-NEWS (Mar. 9, 2010), available at http://www.correctionsone.com/
probation-and-parole/articles/2016631-NC-probation-officers-overloaded-ascaseloads-grow/ (reporting that increased caseloads and a high turnover rate
among probation officers has caused problems in the North Carolina probation
system); Dan Ring, Gov. Deval Patrick Criticizes Bill Aimed at Overhauling
Massachusetts Probation System, THE REPUBLICAN (Apr. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2011/04/gov_deval_patrick_criticizes_b.
html (reporting calls from the legislature and the governor to reform
Massachusetts‟ probation system); Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio Chief Justice
Wants Probation System Change, DESERET NEWS (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700099815/Ohio-chief-justice-wantsprobation-system-change.html (reporting budget problems in Ohio as a possible
catalyst for changing the probation system); see also supra note 63.
135. Although not widely practiced, and even then focused more on
communicating with the probationer‟s mental health provider than the
probationer, the value of the offender‟s input has at least been recognized in
part. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV‟TS, supra note 4, at 122 (“Mental health providers
whose clients are on probation, while being careful not to become monitors of
compliance, can also assist the individual to understand the consequences of
their behavior in terms of sanctions and can build a collaborative relationship
with the specialized probation officers that can benefit the individual. In this
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B. Drug Courts
Another diversion alternative that may inadvertently
impact offenders with a mental disorder are drug courts.
Drug courts are typically designed to divert low-level drug
offenders into substance abuse treatment programs, thereby
enabling them to avoid incarceration but also, hopefully,
diminishing their likelihood of recidivism.136 After the first
such court was established in 1989, the number of drug
courts across the country exploded, with over 2,000 such
courts now established and operative in virtually every
state.137 Because of the high percentage of offenders with a
mental disorder who also have a substance abuse
problem,138 drug courts have the potential to help a

way, the probation officer can have more confidence when making decisions on
how to respond to violations. For example, the officer and the provider can meet
jointly with the individual to identify barriers to compliance and to make
changes in the treatment plan or probation rules as necessary.”).
136. C. WEST HUDDLESTON, III ET AL., NAT‟L DRUG COURT INST., BUREAU OF
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD
ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/12902_
PCP_fnl.pdf (“Drug courts represent the coordinated efforts of justice and
treatment professionals to actively intervene and break the cycle of substance
abuse, addiction, and crime. As an alternative to less effective interventions,
drug courts quickly identify substance-abusing offenders and place them under
ongoing judicial monitoring and community supervision, coupled with effective,
long-term treatment services. In this blending of systems, the drug court
participant undergoes an intensive regimen of substance abuse treatment, case
management, drug testing, and probation supervision while reporting to
regularly scheduled status hearings before a judge with specialized expertise in
the drug court model.” (citations omitted)).
137. Id. at 1; see also RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1 (2009), available at
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/dp_drugcourts.pdf
(providing
background
information on drug courts and the first drug court in America).
138. DITTON, supra note 95, at 7 (noting that 58.7% of state prison inmates,
46.5% of federal prison inmates, 64.6% of local jail inmates, and 49.0% of
probationers with a mental illness reported using alcohol or drugs at the time of
the offense; similarly, 34.4% of state prison inmates, 23.9% of federal prison
inmates, 37.9% of local jail inmates, and 34.8% of probationers with a mental
illness were diagnosed as having a history of alcohol dependence).
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significant number of offenders with a mental illness avoid
incarceration.139
Drug courts, however, are typically not designed to
address the more specific needs of this population. One
limitation is that the drug treatment programs and the
individuals running them are frequently not well equipped
to deal with these offenders‟ co-occurring mental
disorders.140 Further, these courts tend to rely heavily on a
“carrot-and-stick” approach.141 The coercion and therapeutic
pressure they employ to encourage offenders to adhere to a
drug treatment and testing regime is often not an effective
means to help offenders with a mental disorder avoid
relapse.142
139. See HUDDLESTON ET AL., supra note 136, at 2 (“[D]rug courts increase the
probability of participants‟ success by providing a wide array of ancillary
services such as mental health treatment, trauma and family therapy, job skills
training, and many other life-skill enhancement services.”); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 7, at 26; see also Kevin S. Burke, Just What Made Drug
Courts Successful?, 36 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 39, 43-44 (2010)
(outlining the main components of drug courts and their success). See generally
Hildi Hagedorn & Mark L. Willenbring, Psychiatric Illness Among Drug Court
Probationers, 29 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 775 (2003) (describing a study
of drug court probationers with a mental illness).
140. Annette McGaha et al., Lesson from the Broward County Mental Health
Court Evaluation, 25 EVALUATION & PROGRAM PLAN. 125, 125 (2002).
141. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 4.
142. See Riittakerttu Kaltiala-Heino et al., Impact of Coercion on Treatment
Outcome, 20 INT‟L J.L. & PSYCH. 311, 320 (1997) (finding generally that patients
who initially felt coerced were less likely to take medications, use mental health
services, and show improvement in symptoms); Trudi Kirk & Donald N. Bersoff,
How Many Procedural Safeguards Does It Take to Get a Psychiatrist to Leave the
Lightbulb Unchanged? A Due Process Analysis of the MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‟Y & L. 45, 58 (1996) (“[S]tudies on the
effects of coercion on mental health treatment reveal that mental health
treatment consumers are particularly sensitive to the presence of coercion and
react particularly negatively to the persons and systems that exercise the
coercion.”); John Monahan et al., Mandated Treatment in the Community for
People with Mental Disorders, 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 28, 35-36 (2003) (asserting
that incentives and disincentives to facilitate and promote adherence to
treatment by individuals with a mental disorder can be appropriate, but
primarily when these interventions are experienced by these individuals as
being clinically grounded in a caring therapeutic relationship, with the critical
component being whether the intervention “respected their wishes and . . .
„empowered‟ them to become actively engaged as decision-makers in their own
care”).
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C. Mental Health Courts
Another response employed in many states, including
California, Florida, and New York, has been the
establishment of mental health courts (“MHCs”), which
often evolved from and in some instances are akin to drug
courts in their goals and operation.143 Although it has been
said that there is no prototypical MHC,144 these courts
typically attempt to divert non-violent offenders with a
mental disorder from incarceration into a judiciallysupervised mental health treatment regime.145
MHCs often attempt to apply the principles of
therapeutic jurisprudence,146 a school of thought that has
143. See LAUDAN ARON ET AL., NAT‟L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, GRADING
2009: A REPORT ON AMERICA‟S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR ADULTS WITH
SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 42 (2009) (“Approximately 200 communities in 43
states have created mental health courts . . . . These courts operate in
partnership with mental health and substance abuse systems as well as
individual providers to offer court-supervised treatment as an alternative to
incarceration.”); see also Henry J. Steadman et al., Effect of Mental Health
Courts on Arrests and Jail Days, 68 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167 (2011)
(reporting a multisite study of mental health courts‟ effects on criminal justice
outcomes).
THE STATES

144. E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2); Amy Watson et al., Mental Health Courts:
Promises and Limitations, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 476, 477 (2001); see
also Henry J. Steadman et al., Mental Health Courts: Their Promise and
Unanswered Questions, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 457, 457 (2001) (“[T]he strong
support for mental health courts seems to assume that there is a structured
model[,] . . . [however] [d]rug courts vary in their organization by
jurisdiction . . . .”).
145. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 60; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 7, at 26; Kondo, supra note 119, at 403; H. Richard Lamb & Linda E.
Weinberger, Mental Health Courts as a Way to Provide Treatment to Violent
Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 300 JAMA 722, 722 (2008). But see
GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 49 (noting the San Bernardino
Mental Health Court will consider defendants charged with a violent offense if it
becomes clear that what was involved was not a truly violent incident); Carol
Fisler, Building Trust and Managing Risk: A Look at a Felony Mental Health
Court, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‟Y & L. 587, 593 (2005) (discussing reasons for
allowing felony offenders into mental health courts, including providing
treatment for offenders and preserving judicial resources).
146. Roger A. Boothroyd et al., The Broward Mental Health Court: Process,
Outcomes and Service Utilization, 26 INT‟L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 55, 55 (2003); see
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM.
L. BULL. 244, 257 (2002) (providing a general overview of therapeutic
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explored alternatives to the conventional CJS approach. 147
Proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence recognize that an
offender‟s interactions with CJS actors and processes can
have both therapeutic and anti-therapeutic consequences,148
and seek to enhance the design and application of the CJS
to promote the psychological well-being of participants
without sacrificing other societal values.149
MHCs attempt to reduce the criminal behavior of
offenders with a mental disorder by directly addressing the
disorder associated with the illegal conduct.150 The general
assumption, although it may and perhaps should be
questioned, is that there is a causal link between the
disorder and the criminal behavior.151 MHCs are thus
limited to defendants with an identified mental disorder,
although courts differ in defining this eligibility

jurisprudence and its principles); Arthur J. Lurigio & Jessica Snowden, Putting
Therapeutic Jurisprudence into Practice: The Growth, Operations, and
Effectiveness of Mental Health Court, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 196, 198 (2009); Allison D.
Redlich et al., Patterns of Practice in Mental Health Courts: A National Survey,
30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 347, 349 (2006). See generally Nancy Wolff, Courts as
Therapeutic Agents: Thinking Past the Novelty of Mental Health Courts, 30 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 431, 431-33 (2002) (discussing the assumptions
underlying the therapeutic approach of mental health courts).
147. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal
Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 279, 280-83 (1993).
148. Juan Dalmau Ramirez, Inauguration Therapeutic Jurisprudence Forum
of the International Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R.
95, 95 (1998).
149. Id. at 95; Robert F. Schopp, Integrating Restorative Justice and
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 665, 666 (1998); David B.
Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Introduction to LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, at xvii,
xvii (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996).
150. Wolff, supra note 146, at 431.
151. Johnston, supra note 144, manuscript at 9-10 (“[M]ental health courts
justify segregating and diverting individuals with mental illnesses from the
traditional justice system on the basis that their illnesses likely contributed to
their criminal behavior. . . . [However,] social and psychological research
demonstrates that the criminal acts of individuals with mental illnesses often do
not stem from their disorders but may arise from a number of motivations. . . .
In addition, the weight of recent scientific evidence demonstrates that mental
illness is not a direct contributor to recidivism for most offenders with mental
illnesses.”).
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requirement.152 MHCs also commonly consider the type of
offense committed when determining eligibility, with 27% of
them
restricting
participation to offenders with
misdemeanor charges, although roughly half (46%) of them
accept participants charged with felonies if the criminal
behavior was non-violent in nature.153
While MHCs function as criminal courts, they differ
significantly from traditional courts in terms of the
procedures they employ, using a non-adversarial “team”
approach with the judge, the offender, and the defending
and prosecuting attorneys assuming “cooperative” roles.154
Initial attention may be given to the offenders‟ competence
to participate in the proceedings and understand that
participation is voluntary, and to ensuring that they chose
to enroll of their own accord.155 Although participation may
occur pre-adjudication, many MHCs operate on a postadjudicatory basis and require a preceding plea of guilty or
nolo contendere.156 Proceedings are typically informal157 and
discussions of the charges tend to be limited.158 Emphasis
152. A national survey of MHCs found that up to one-third limited eligibility
to offenders with an Axis I diagnosis as defined by the DSM-IV, such as
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depression. Fewer than 10% allowed
individuals with developmental disabilities to participate, and only 3% accepted
defendants with a primary Axis II diagnosis, effectively closing off access for
offenders with “less serious” personality disorders. Other courts eschew specific
diagnostic criteria and focus instead on the severity of the mental illness, using
entry criteria such as a “severe and persistent mental illness.” Lurigio &
Snowden, supra note 146, at 205.
153. Id. at 206. However, at least some MHCs have begun to accept
defendants charged with some violent felonies as well. See Johnston, supra note
144, manuscript at 3.
154. Redlich et al., supra note 146, at 48.
155. See GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 13-14, 27-28, 37-39, 52;
Boothroyd et al., supra note 146, at 58 (determining that “transcripts contained
some mention of a defendant‟s competence-to-proceed in 29.4% of cases” with
voluntary participation addressed in 15.7% of the cases). Questions have been
raised, however, about how often such participation is truly voluntary.
GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 73; Johnston, supra note 144,
manuscript at 6-7, n.23.
156. Patricia A. Griffin et al., The Use of Criminal Charges and Sanctions in
Mental Health Courts, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1285, 1286 (2002).
157. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 17.
158. Boothroyd et al., supra note 146, at 58.
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instead is often on a mandated and supervised program of
community treatment that typically requires the offender to
take prescribed medications.159 Compliance with the
treatment program is usually supervised by either
dedicated court personnel or community treatment
professionals indirectly linked to the court.160 MHCs
encourage adherence to treatment plans by offering
incentives for compliance and sanctions for noncompliance.
Incentives range widely from simple praise from the judge
at weekly status review hearings to having the initial
charges dropped or the conviction vacated after successful
completion of the requirements imposed by the MHC.161
Sanctions for non-compliance also vary considerably,
including requiring that more mental health services be
obtained, increasing the frequency of supervision, and
expelling participants from the program and placing them
in jail.162 One of the purported strengths of the MHC system
is its ability to forge and enhance linkages between the CJS
and the community mental health system.163
Concerns, however, have also been expressed about the
MHC system. For example, because it does not attempt to
process offenders as quickly as the traditional criminal
court, necessitates making additional services available,
and requires extensive judicial involvement, the

159. Allison D. Redlich, Voluntary, But Knowing and Intelligent?, 11 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL‟Y & L. 605, 606 (2005); see also Boothroyd et al., supra note 146, at 58
(noting discussions addressed treatment/placement issues (83.6% of cases),
current or prior symptoms and diagnoses (42.2%), and use of psychotropic
medications (24.5%)). While beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted
that heavy reliance on medications to address mental illness is the subject of
considerable ongoing debate. See generally IRVING KIRSCH, THE EMPEROR‟S NEW
DRUGS: EXPLODING THE ANTIDEPRESSANT MYTH 3 (2010) (“In this book I invite you
to share this journey in which I moved from acceptance to dissent, and finally to
a thorough rejection of the conventional view of antidepressants.”); ROBERT
WHITAKER, ANATOMY OF AN EPIDEMIC: MAGIC BULLETS, PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, AND
THE ASTONISHING RISE OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN AMERICA 11 (2010) (“[I]f we uncover
. . . that psychiatric drugs are in fact fueling the epidemic of disabling mental
illness—what then?”).
160. Redlich, supra note 159, at 607.
161. Id. at 607-08.
162. Lurigio & Snowden, supra note 146, at 207.
163. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 67-68.
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considerable expense of this alternative has been noted.164
As state systems in general and court systems in particular
face significant budgetary constraints,165 the question arises
whether the funding needed for MHCs can be sustained
even for those courts that have been previously established,
much less be found to support such programs in the many
jurisdictions that do not currently have a MHC. 166 In
addition, some have questioned whether these courts
actually reduce recidivism, a pivotal issue in light of their
expense.167 Another concern is that MHCs, with their
tendency to limit participation to relatively highfunctioning, treatment-compliant offenders—which may in
part explain the purported successes they have achieved—
may not benefit those offenders who have the greatest
treatment needs and are the most vulnerable within the
CJS.168

164. Christin E. Keele, Criminalization of the Mentally Ill: The Challenging
Role of the Defense Attorney in the Mental Health Court System, 71 UMKC L.
REV. 193, 203 (2002).
165. Bob Drogin, Trials Halted to Save Money, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2008, at A1
(“At least [20] states, including California, have slashed court budgets and other
government services as their economies have tanked.”); Paul Elias, San
Francisco Court Closure: 200 Employees and 25 Courtrooms Gone, HUFFPOST
SAN FRANCISCO (July 18, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/18/sanfrancisco-courtroom-closure_n_902097.html; Joseph Goldstein, After Cuts,
Defendants‟ Wait to See a Judge Often Exceeds 24 Hours, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2011, at A22; Lloyd Mann, California Financial Crisis Hits Los Angeles Courts
Hard, EXAMINER.COM (July 7, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/legal-professionin-los-angeles/california-financial-crisis-hits-los-angeles-courts-hard
(“As
a
result of the severe financial crisis in California, Los Angeles Courtrooms will be
going out of business for one day this month, followed by one day each month
until further notice.”); John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for Courts Risk
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, November 27, 2011, at A18; Wyatt, supra note 89.
166. Steve Kanigher, Nevada‟s Mental Health Courts Are in Serious Jeopardy,
LAS VEGAS SUN, May 1, 2011, at 1; Shannon Murphy, Mental Health Court May
Lose State Funding, Advocates Try to Save „Life-changing‟ Program, FLINT J.
(Michigan), Mar. 16, 2009, at A3.
167. Johnston, supra note 144, manuscript at 4-5 (“It is unclear whether
mental health courts actually reduce recidivism . . . . The few rigorous studies
that have been published have reached generally positive but inconsistent
conclusions, ranging from finding no effect on re-arrest rate to a decrease in
recidivism . . . of fifteen percent at eighteen months.” (citations omitted)).
168. See Wolff, supra note 146, at 432. Wolff has criticized MHCs for only
accepting offenders who have committed low-level offenses, have no prior
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Such courts may also find it difficult to identify needed
community treatment services, particularly when the
availability of such services is limited or costly, mental
health providers are unwilling to work with this population,
or these services have previously proven ineffective for the
individual.169 Concern has also been raised that the
interjection of these courts may have the effect of skewing
the mental health service delivery system by placing a new
and significant demand on limited existing treatment
resources.170
In addition, although MHCs may be more effective than
traditional courts at encouraging treatment compliance, a
substantial number of offenders still decline these
services.171 A key factor for these courts is the level of
coercion perceived by the offender.172 It is believed that
treatment is less likely to be accessed and to be successful if
the offender believes it was imposed.173 Particularly if the
relatively coercive model employed by drug courts is relied
upon,174 offenders with a mental disorder may be less

criminal histories of violence, and are willing to accept that they need treatment
for, or assistance with, their mental disorder. Id. at 431.
169. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 75-76; Keele, supra note
164, at 202.
170. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 75-76; Johnston, supra note
144, manuscript at 7 (noting “the potential of these courts to divert resources
from law-abiding individuals with mental illnesses”); Keele, supra note 164, at
202. For a discussion of recent cut-backs in the availability of mental health
services in general, see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
171. Boothroyd et al., supra note 146, at 63-64 (finding that 53% of the
offenders appearing before a mental health court used behavioral health
services after their court appearance compared to only 28% of the offenders
appearing before a non-mental health comparison court).
172. Poythress et al., supra note 14, at 519-20, 526; see also supra note 142 and
accompanying text.
173. Poythress et al., supra note 14, at 519-20, 526.
174. See, e.g., GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 57 (“[P]articipants
who cannot comply with the requirements of the treatment process are
sanctioned . . . . They often receive stern lectures and reprimands, . . . possibly
being placed in a more restrictive and structured treatment setting, and,
occasionally, being returned to jail until further plans can be made.”).
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receptive to and compliant with the mandated treatment
program.175
Similarly, although an effort is made to engage
offenders during the proceedings, their involvement, while
greater than under the traditional criminal justice model,
remains relatively limited.176 To the extent offenders with a
mental disorder are not engaged by the MHC proceedings,
they may fail to develop insights into the consequences of
their criminal acts and their need for mental health
treatment.177 Related to these challenges, another
apprehension is that MHCs, as an appendage of the
175. See id. at 20 (“How well punitive (deterrent) sanctions serve to promote
the therapeutic process in a mental health setting remains an important and
somewhat controversial question.”); id. at 54 (“San Bernardino differs from the
other early mental health courts in its close adaptation of the drug court model
to the mental health court treatment process, including the use of jail as a
sanction.”); Johnston, supra note 144, manuscript at 6 (“Some commentators . . .
have expressed concerns about the coercive nature of the courts . . . .” (citing
Redlich, supra note 159)); Keele, supra note 164, at 200-01.
176. Boothroyd et al., supra note 146, at 57 (noting that, on average, fifty-four
utterances were made at the initial hearing, with the defendant making
seventeen of them). Indeed, a variable considered important for the successful
functioning of a MHC is whether the offender perceives that he or she has been
treated fairly, treated with respect by the judge, and allowed to voice his or her
personal situation. Poythress et al., supra note 14, at 520-21, 527.
177. For example, Bernstein & Seltzer have noted that:
Many of the existing [mental health] courts include practices that are
unnecessarily burdensome to defendants, that make it harder for them
to reintegrate into the community and that may compromise their
rights.
Few of the courts are part of any comprehensive plan to address the
underlying failure of the service system to reach and effectively address
the needs of people at risk of arrest. Substantial numbers of mental
health court participants are people who should not have been arrested
in the first place. . . .
....
No diversion or alternative disposition program . . . can be effective
unless the services and supports that individuals with serious mental
illnesses need to live in the community are available.
Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 7, at 147. Similarly, to the extent that an
offender is not competent to participate in these proceedings, the offender is also
unlikely to be engaged by and benefit from the MHC proceedings. See Johnston,
supra note 144, manuscript at 6 (“[Some commentators] have expressed
concerns about . . . offenders‟ competence to consent to diversion.”).
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relatively fast-paced CJS, may find it difficult to tolerate the
relatively slow, erratic, and uncertain course of treatment
often associated with offenders who have a mental disorder,
thus making ill-suited demands of offenders that are
counter-productive.178
Finally, and of particular relevance to this Article,
although some effort is typically made to have the offender
play a role in the proceedings and engage in a dialogue with
the judge,179 studies show that participation by and input
from the victim of the crime is quite limited.180 Relatedly,
concern has been voiced that MHCs allow offenders to
escape responsibility for their actions, which may undercut
the restorative function of the CJS and fail to repair the
harm done to the victim and to prior relationships involving
the victim, the community, and the offender.181
Writing about several of the problems MHCs illicit, one
commentator contends there are “other ways to engage the
court as a therapeutic agent that will yield a better portfolio
of consequences.”182 Developing an alternative with a
stronger restorative justice component may provide a
valuable (and less expensive) alternative to MHCs, drug
courts, probation, and other mechanisms for (1) diverting
offenders with a mental disorder away from incarceration,
(2) reducing recidivism, and (3) promoting the well-being
and recovery of these individuals, while also better
addressing the needs of the victims of these crimes.

178. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 73-75.
179. Poythress et al., supra note 14, at 521 (“In MHC defendants become
engaged in a dialogue with a highly respected authority who speaks to them in a
respectful manner.”). But see Boothroyd et al., supra note 146, at 57 (noting that
only 33% of the utterances made at initial MHC hearings came from the
defendant).
180. Boothroyd et al., supra note 146, at 57 (determining that other witnesses,
including victims, did not testify at MHC hearings). But see Poythress et al.,
supra note 14, at 518 (determining that the consent of the victim is required
before an individual charged with assault may come before the Broward County
MHC).
181. See Keele, supra note 164, at 202.
182. Wolff, supra note 146, at 431.
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IV. THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH
The restorative justice approach, somewhat like
problem-solving courts, seeks to move beyond the relatively
narrow emphasis of the CJS on imposing punishment. The
restorative justice model emphasizes instead reparation for
the harm incurred by the victim, reintegration of the
offender into the community, and the restoration of the
community‟s moral equilibrium and tranquility.183 Although
formally dating only from the 1970s,184 this approach has
become widely established and employed.185 Proponents
view restorative justice as an approach that offers “a far
more accountable, understandable, and healing system of
justice” than the traditional CJS, which they believe
alienates both offenders and victims.186 While proponents
generally recognize that this approach is not a useful
183. Schopp, supra note 149, at 666-67.
184. Brenda Sims Blackwell & Clark D. Cunningham, Taking the Punishment
Out of the Process: From Substantive Criminal Justice Through Procedural
Justice to Restorative Justice, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 59,
68 (2004). The roots of the restorative justice approach, however, have been
traced back to antiquity when communities had to rely upon themselves to
resolve a dispute stemming from a breach of society‟s norms. JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 5 (2002) (“Restorative justice
has been the dominant model of criminal justice throughout most of human
history for perhaps all the world‟s peoples.”); HEATHER STRANG, REPAIR OR
REVENGE: VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 3-5 (2002). In addition, the juvenile
justice system in this country has long contained elements of a restorative
justice approach. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Parameters and Implementation
of a Right to Mental Health Treatment for Juvenile Offenders, 12 VA. J. SOC.
POL‟Y & L. 61, 72-82 (2004); Steve Mulligan, From Retribution to Repair:
Juvenile Justice and the History of Restorative Justice, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV.
139, 139-40 (2009); William R. Nugent et al., Participation in Victim-Offender
Mediation and the Prevalence of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior: A MetaAnalysis, 14 RES. SOC. WORK PRAC. 408, 408 (2004).
185. There are over 300 mediation programs in North America and more than
500 in Europe. PRISON FELLOWSHIP INT‟L, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & RECONCILIATION,
RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE
BRIEFING
PAPER
1
(2008),
available
at
http://www.pfi.org/cjr/restorative-justice/introduction-to-restorative-justicepractice-and-outcomes/briefings/what-is-restorative-justice.
186. Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the 21st Century: A Social
Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 304 (2005).
In addition, as courts across the country have come under increasing fiscal
pressure, the restorative justice approach may provide a valuable alternative.
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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vehicle for fact-finding or adjudicating guilt,187 they assert
that having the victim and offender participate voluntarily
in a session designed to reach an equitable and just outcome
can lead to better long-term consequences for those
involved.188
Methodologically, a restorative justice approach, like
mediation and family conferencing,189 employs informal
interactions and decision-making that actively involves the
victim, the offender, and relevant members of the
community in seeking to develop mutual understanding and
an acceptable plan for both repairing the harm done and
preventing future harm by the offender.190 A variation on
this model also seeks to “restore” the criminal offender to
the community, as offenders may have become alienated
and have “lost connection with any kind of healthy or
supportive community.”191 These sessions involve an
exchange of information that enables the participants to
appreciate what precipitated these events, as well as their
consequences and impact.192 The goal is a cathartic process
in which offenders express shame and remorse for their
actions and in which the victims then forgive the offenders
for their acts.193 This exchange is intended to promote the
recovery of the victim, generate insights and reduce
recidivism by the offender, and allow for the reintegration of
the offender into the community.194

187. Schopp, supra note 149, at 668.
188. See Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the
Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 177-78.
189. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and
Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 130-31 (2004) (“Victimoffender mediation brings offenders . . . and victims face to face. . . . Family
group conferences bring together the families of offenders and victims to discuss
crimes, mediated by a trained facilitator.”).
190. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 184, at 11.
191. Blackwell & Cunningham, supra note 184, at 59, 69. This variation also
enables the restorative justice approach to be applied to so-called “victimless”
crimes (e.g., traffic offenses, drug possession, prostitution, gambling), with the
focus on the harm to the community at large. Id. at 69.
192. See id. at 68.
193. Schopp, supra note 149, at 667.
194. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 184, at 69.
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The restorative justice approach focuses on the harm
suffered by the individuals involved, the adverse effect on
their relationships, and the deleterious impact to the
surrounding community, asserting that a failure to redress
this damage will result in future crime and a weakening
and deterioration of community life.195 Its proponents argue
that the traditional criminal justice approach “invites the
public and legal system to indulge the passion for revenge
untroubled by moral qualms.”196 Restorative justice, on the
other hand, stands for the proposition that “justice” must
amount to more than punishing the guilty: that crime
“creates obligations to make things right,” and that
responses to crime should be aimed at “healing the wounds”
caused by the criminal acts.197
Victims, offenders, and the community in which they
live are viewed as the primary stakeholders in the process,
not the abstract entity referred to as the “State.”198 From
this perspective, the State is not entitled to dictate the
decision-making process and impose sanctions unilaterally
following a criminal act.199 Further, this model seeks to
restore a sense of control to the victims by allowing them to
determine what they need physically and emotionally to
repair the harm they experienced.200 It also attempts to
enhance insight and responsibility in offenders by helping
them appreciate the consequences of their actions and by
giving them a sense of control over the steps taken to make
amends for their actions.201
195. See GORDON BAZEMORE & MARA SCHIFF, RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE
4 (2001).
196. David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623,
1652 (1992).
197. BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 195, at 7.
198. See id. at 8.
199. Allison Morris & Warren Young, Reforming Criminal Justice: The
Potential of Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY TO
PRACTICE 11, 14 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2000).
200. Id. at 17.
201. Id. at 18 (“The presence of victims also means that offenders‟
justifications for their offending—„she could afford it‟, „he is insured‟, and so on—
can be challenged. Indeed, restorative conferences are typically emotionally
powerful occasions far removed from the typical courtroom . . . . Overall, about a
half of the young offenders . . . said that they had felt involved in the
conferencing process at least in some way. They were able to say what they
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In sum, restorative justice seeks to promote the
regeneration of all involved parties. Unlike conventional
procedures, this approach directly addresses the emotional
impact of the crime that occurred.202 Proponents emphasize:
[I]n any situation in which we have been harmed in some way
. . . our hope is that the person responsible for the harm will at the
very least acknowledge what he or she did, perhaps recognize the
devastating effects his or her acts created in our life, and maybe
even offer an apology. . . . Though we might find support from our
family and friends for our misfortune, without an
acknowledgment of our lessened state by the one who caused it,
we find it hard to simmer down; we feel that we are still being
dismissed, that our needs are being written off, that we don‟t
203
count.

As noted, in the conventional system, victims are
excluded from the process almost entirely,204 leaving them
with an emotional void that can be difficult to fill. During a
restorative session, victims can seek an acknowledgement of
the harm done from the offender, accept an ensuing apology,
and move forward with their recovery.205 Further,
acknowledging the harm can indicate that the thought
process underlying and responsible for the crime has begun
to dissolve, replaced by a greater concern for others and the
taking of steps to prevent recurrences.206 The crime cannot
be undone, but research shows that “[o]nce we hear words
spoken that acknowledge the pain and distress of our lives,
as we experience it, we find ourselves enabled to move on,
even if only slightly.”207

wanted to and to speak without pressure . . . . They also acknowledged the
power of meeting victims.”).
202. Id. at 17.
203. SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 55, at 2-3 (citations omitted).
204. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. As discussed, even in
conjunction with mental health court proceedings, the impact of a crime on the
victim receives little attention and the victim has little role to play in
subsequent CJS proceedings. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
205. See Schopp, supra note 149, at 667.
206. See Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 18.
207. SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 55, at 4.
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The offender is also expected to benefit from a
restorative justice session.208 Supporters of this approach
assert that conventional programs often “show little or no
concern for the needs of those who were the source of the
harm, writing them off as animals or non-persons.”209 The
restorative justice model, however, seeks to rehabilitate
offenders and restore them to the community.210 Interactions
with and reparations to the victim can be equally cathartic
for offenders, who, after being given an opportunity to
explain their actions and to see how their actions were
viewed by other parties, can begin to forgive society and
various individuals for perceived injustices, acknowledge
responsibility, form bonds again with the victim and other
individuals, and take the necessary steps to reenter the
community.211
Both material and symbolic reparations are important
facets of restorative justice. As stated, a process is required
in which (1) the offender expresses genuine shame and
remorse for his/her actions, and (2) the victim forgives the
offender.212 Restorative justice proponents believe that the
offender‟s expression of genuine shame is the key to an
effective session.213 Shame functions to bring home to
208. See Blackwell & Cunningham, supra note 184, at 69.
209. SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 55, at 21-22; see also Poythress et al., supra
note 14, at 521 (“[CJS] [h]earings are conducted by remote video, the judge and
attorneys do most of the talking, and the implicit (if not explicit) agenda appears
to be quick resolution of the charges, often through a plea agreement that is
offered by the judge and agreed to by counsel, and defendants usually are not
encouraged to speak except in response to plea offerings.”).
210. See Blackwell & Cunningham, supra note 184, at 68.
211. Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 18.
212. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
213. Gabrielle Maxwell & Allison Morris, What Is the Place of Shame in
Restorative Justice?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 131, 134
(Howard Zehr & Barb Toews eds., 2004). Skeptics may assert that an offender‟s
mouthing of the words of apology and shame is merely an empty exercise
motivated by a desire to avoid punishment, but it should be noted that
psychological research suggests that expressing shame, if it is not the product of
external force, can shape the person‟s attitudes to become more consistent with
the statements expressed (i.e., the act of saying words, increases belief in the
words). See PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO ET AL., INFLUENCING ATTITUDES AND CHANGING
BEHAVIOR 72 (1977) (“To change attitudes according to dissonance theory, first
induce behavior change under manipulated conditions of high choice and
minimally adequate justification, then provide an opportunity for the new
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offenders the seriousness and consequences of the offense.214
The goal is not to humiliate them, as that is likely to simply
harden them and increase recidivism, but rather to give
them insights from which they can learn and thereby avoid
such behavior in the future.215 Advocates acknowledge that
sometimes offenders experience too little shame or are too
apathetic for a session to be successful.216 Nevertheless, the
emotional meeting of the minds gained through the shame
and forgiveness sequence is an integral part of the
restorative justice process.217
Considerable empirical evidence shows that a
restorative justice approach can be effective.218 Indeed,
victims, offenders, and community representatives have all
expressed high satisfaction levels with the restorative
justice process.219
For example, a number of studies have found that
victims involved in the criminal justice process prefer (1) a
less formal process where their views are solicited and carry
weight, (2) more information about developments in and the
outcomes of their cases, (3) increased participation in their
cases, (4) respectful and fair treatment, and (5) emotional

attitude to be expressed.”); Eric Stice, The Similarities Between Cognitive
Dissonance and Guilt: Confession as a Relief of Dissonance, 11 CURRENT
PSYCHOL. 69, 69 (1992) (“[B]oth dissonance and guilt are states of negative
emotional arousal. Thus, both dissonance and guilt may motivate the individual
to act in ways that reduce this negative effect once it has been aroused.”).
214. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 178-79 (1989).
215. Id. at 179; SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 55, at 45-46; Thomas J. Scheff,
Community Conferences: Shame and Anger in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67
REV. JUR. U.P.R. 97, 104-05 (1998).
216. Scheff, supra note 215, at 105.
217. Maxwell & Morris, supra note 213, at 138.
218. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 184, at 69; see also NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, REOFFENDING ANALYSIS FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE CASES: 2008 AND
2009—A SUMMARY (2011); Kate E. Bloch, Reconceptualizing Restorative Justice,
7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 201, 208 (2010).
219. Bloch, supra note 218, at 208; John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice:
Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 20 (1999);
AUDREY EVJE & ROBERT CUSHMAN, A SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATIONS OF SIX
CALIFORNIA VICTIM OFFENDER RECONCILIATION PROGRAMS 3 (2000), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/vorp.pdf; Poulson, supra note 188, at 198.
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restoration, including an apology from the offender. 220 One
five-year study found these preferences are more often
realized in cases randomly assigned to a restorative justice
session than in cases assigned to a court for resolution.221
Victims tend to say their session was helpful and allowed
them to address and resolve their feelings about the offense
and the offender.222 In addition, involvement in a restorative
justice session has been shown to: decrease victims‟ feelings
of fear, anger, and anxiety; enhance their sense of dignity,
self-respect, and self-confidence; and enable them to forgive
the offender and develop a sense of closure regarding their
case.223 A particularly striking result was that more than
half the victims of violence whose cases were resolved
through traditional court proceedings said they would harm
their offender if they had the chance, compared to only 9%
of those who had completed a restorative justice session.224
220. STRANG, supra note 184, at 198; Strang & Sherman, supra note 74, at 2025.
221. Strang & Sherman, supra note 74, at 25-35. The study found that 79% of
the victims assigned to a restorative justice session reported they were informed
in good time about when their case was to be decided (vs. 14% of the victims
assigned to a court proceeding). Id. at 26-27. In addition, 93% said they were
given an opportunity to explain the loss and harm that resulted, id. at 28, and
86% (vs. 16%) said they received apologies from the offender. Id. Meanwhile,
only 5% (vs. 18%) said they expected the offender to repeat the offense, id. at 29,
and 90% reported they had been treated fairly and with respect. Id. at 35.
222. STRANG, supra note 184, at 198; see also Braithwaite, supra note 219, at
22 (noting that 79% of victims were satisfied with the outcome vs. only 57% of
those who did not have mediation); Poulson, supra note 188, at 178-98. Poulson
collapsed results from all relevant empirical studies, and found that victims in
restorative justice were 3.4 times more likely than victims in court to believe
that the criminal justice system was fair, Poulson, supra note 185, at 179; 2.8
times more likely to be satisfied with the way their case was handled, id. at 180;
8.8 times more likely to believe that they had been able to tell their story during
the proceedings, id. at 182; and 2.3 times more likely to say that the mediator
had been fair than to say that about the judge. Id. at 186. They were also 4.9
times more likely to say that the offender had been held accountable, id. at 188;
2.6 times more likely to rate the outcome as fair, id. at 192; 2.3 times more
likely to be satisfied with the outcome, id. at 193; 2.4 times more likely to end
up with better perceptions of the other parties‟ behavior, id. at 194; half as
likely to feel upset about the crime afterwards, id. at 196; and one-third as
likely to be afraid of revictimization. Id. at 197.
223. STRANG, supra note 184, at 198; see also Poulson, supra note 188, at 178,
182.
224. Poulson, supra note 188, at 178, 182.
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In addition, participants reported increased levels of
satisfaction with the CJS in general.225
Studies have also found a high level of success and
satisfaction among offenders participating in restorative
justice programs.226 For example, an analysis found that
64% to 100% of reparation and compensation agreements
generated by a restorative justice session were fully
completed by the offenders.227 In general, rates of restitution
and compliance with agreements by offenders have been
found to be significantly higher than in traditional court
settings.228 Further, offenders generally have been found to
act in a more positive manner following conviction when
they perceive that the criminal justice process is just and
fair,229 and research indicates that they perceive restorative
justice sessions as more fair and more just than the
traditional CJS process.230 It has also been asserted that
225. ROBERT DAVIS ET AL., MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION AS ALTERNATIVE TO
PROSECUTION IN FELONY ARREST CASES, AN EVALUATION OF THE BROOKLYN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER 64 (1980); MARK S. UMBREIT, MEDIATION OF
CRIMINAL CONFLICT: AN ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAMS IN FOUR CANADIAN PROVINCES
106 (1995).
226. Braithwaite, supra note 219, at 26 (“[O]ffender satisfaction . . . has been
extremely high.”).
227. Id. at 23-24; see also Blackwell & Cunningham, supra note 184, at 68-83.
228. See, e.g., Jeff Latimer et al., The Effectiveness of Restorative Justice
Practices: A Meta-Analysis, 85 PRISON J. 127, 137 (2005) (finding 33% higher
restitutionary compliance compared to control cases); Mark Umbreit et al.,
Victim Offender Mediation: Evidence Based Practice Over Three Decades, THE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 455, 461-63 (2005) (ascertaining 81%
compliance rates in restorative justice cases compared to 58% in court).
229. See infra Part V.
230. Braithwaite, supra note 219, at 26-27; see also Bloch, supra note 218, at
208; Latimer et al., supra note 228, at 136; Poulson, supra note 188, at 178-98.
After collapsing results from all relevant empirical studies, Poulson found that
offenders in restorative justice sessions were 2.0 times more likely than
offenders in court to believe that the CJS was fair, Poulson, supra note 188, at
178-79; 1.9 times more likely to be satisfied with the way their case was
handled, id. at 181; and 4.1 times more likely to believe they had been able to
tell their story during the proceedings. Id. at 183. Offenders were also 2.1 times
more likely to believe their opinions were adequately considered, id. at 185; 6.0
times more likely to say the mediator had been fair than to say that about the
judge, id. at 186; 4.8 times more likely to say they had been held accountable,
id. at 188; 2.6 times more likely to rate the outcome as fair, id. at 191-92; 1.6
times more likely to be satisfied with the outcome, id. at 193; 1.9 times more
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offenders derive an increased sense of self-respect from the
restorative justice process.231
In addition, research on restorative justice programs
has shown a reduction in the recidivism rates of
participating offenders.232 One study found that offenders
who apologized to their victims were three times less likely
to be convicted of a subsequent crime during the next four
years than those who had not.233 This study also determined
that offenders who participated in restorative justice
sessions with their victims were over four times less likely
to be convicted again during the next four years than when
no victim had been present.234 As one commentator put it,
“the court/prison system encourages offenders to deny their
responsibility, which may be one reason for [its] high rate of
recidivism.”235
Reintegration into the community is another priority of
the restorative justice process. Offenders who participated
in a restorative justice program were more likely to find
jobs, pursue educational goals, and partner with community
members. When these steps were taken, offenders were
likely to end up with better perceptions of the other parties‟ behavior, id. at 194;
and 6.9 times more likely to apologize. Id. at 190.
231. Strang & Sherman, supra note 74, at 37.
232. Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice and Sexual Assault: An Archival
Study of Court and Conference Cases, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 334, 351 (2006)
(participating youth sexual offenders had a lower prevalence of reoffending than
those who did not); EVJE & CUSHMAN, supra note 219, at 49, 60, 69, 84, 96, 103
(showing that five of six victim-offender mediation programs surveyed reported
reduced recidivism); see also Strang & Sherman, supra note 74, at 38-39 (noting
that in all seven randomized field trials of restorative justice diversions from
prosecution, the diversion program had worked at least as well as prosecution in
preventing repeat offending and in two of the trials, restorative justice had
clearly done better). For a review of studies comparing the recidivism rates of
offenders who participated in restorative justice sessions, see Braithwaite, supra
note 219, at 27-30.
233. HEATHER STRANG & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:
PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICE 19 (2000) (citing GABRIELLE MAXWELL & ALLISON
MORRIS, UNDERSTANDING RE-OFFENDING (1999)); see also Poulson, supra note
188, at 202 (reporting a 32% reduction in recidivism after one year for
participants in a restorative justice program compared to non-participants).
234. STRANG & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 233, at 19.
235. Scheff, supra note 215, at 100.
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subsequently less likely to be convicted of crimes.236 In
general, the research has demonstrated that these
programs can outperform traditional court proceedings.237
V. THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE APPROACH
The framework of “procedural justice,” drawn from the
field of social psychology, can also provide useful guidance
for crafting a better response to criminal offenders. This
model asserts that people‟s evaluations of the resolution of a
dispute (including matters resolved by the judicial system)
are influenced more by their perception of the fairness of
the process employed than by their belief regarding whether
the “right” outcome was reached.238 In other words,
procedural justice proponents believe that “process
matters,” such that “when the people affected by a decisionmaking process perceive the process to be just, they are
much more likely to accept the outcomes of the process,
even when the outcomes are adverse.”239
Moreover, the benefits of procedural justice are not
limited to an acceptance of the immediate decision. Rather,
“acceptance of decisions made by legal actors is associated
with higher levels of perceived legitimacy of the legal
system as well as a heightened sense of obligation to obey
the law and cooperate with legal authorities.”240

236. STRANG & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 233, at 20.
237. Poulson, supra note 188, at 177 (“Overall, restorative justice practices
substantially outperformed court on almost every item for both victims and
offenders.”).
238. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26, 26
(2007) (“Studies suggest first that procedural justice has an impact on whether
people accept and abide by the decisions made by the courts, both immediately
and over time. Second, procedural justice influences how people evaluate the
judges and other court personnel they deal with, as well as the court system and
the law.”). See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 1 (1988) (“[This book] views people as more interested
in issues of process than issues of outcome, and it addresses the way in which
their evaluations of experiences and relationships are influenced by the form of
social interaction.”). .
239. Michael M. O‟Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 478
(2009).
240. Id.

2012]

FORGING LINKS AND RENEWING TIES

201

Research further shows that an effective alternative
dispute resolution mechanism requires the implementation
of procedural justice. It has been determined that “the use
of fair procedures encourages a positive climate among the
parties, which is more likely to promote both a long-term
relationship and adherence to the agreements made about
how to handle issues . . . that are related to that
relationship.”241 It has also been noted that “fair procedures
lead to a concern about delivering gains to all parties rather
than winning over others” and are “a key to the
development of stable and lasting solutions to conflicts.”242
In terms of what makes a particular process
procedurally just, several factors have been identified,
including whether: (1) the individual had an opportunity to
state his or her case and provide input when decisions were
being made (“voice”); (2) authorities were seen as unbiased,
consistent, and principled (“neutrality”); and (3) authorities
were seen as benevolent and having honestly considered the
individual‟s needs and concerns (“trustworthiness”).243
Of direct relevance to this Article, studies indicate that
procedural justice is a key to the success of mental health
241. Tyler, supra note 238, at 26.
242. Id. at 27. In one study, adults arrested for driving while intoxicated had
their case resolved through alternative legal procedures. Interviewed two years
later, it was determined that their views of the legitimacy of the law were
related to their perceptions of the fairness of their case. Those who saw their
hearing as fairer reoffended at a reduced rate of 25% during the four years after
their hearing. Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice,
and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders‟ Psychological Mechanisms in the
Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW & SOC‟Y REV. 553,
555-58 (2007); see also TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 28-45 (2002)
(studying a sample of 1,656 people in Los Angeles and Oakland regarding a
recent personal experience with the police or the courts, it was found that the
primary factor shaping the willingness to accept a court‟s decision was the
fairness of the proceedings, with procedural justice also the primary factor
shaping overall views about the court system; results were consistent regardless
of the person‟s social or economic background, gender, and whether the person
was white, Hispanic, or African-American); Blackwell & Cunningham, supra
note 184, at 60-67.
243. O‟Hear, supra note 239, at 479; see also Adam Lamparello, Incorporating
the Procedural Justice Model Into Federal Sentencing Jurisprudence in the
Aftermath of United States v. Booker: Establishing United States Sentencing
Courts, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 112, 118-19 (2009).
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courts.244 As noted, attention has been given to ensuring
that participation in these courts is voluntary and that a
cooperative approach be employed.245 It has been asserted
that mental health courts will be more successful if they
listen to participants and incorporate their views into
treatment decisions.246 Rather than being passive
participants in a traditional court with “a clear agenda of
rapid case disposition,” participants should be actively
“engaged in a dialogue with a highly-respected authority
who speaks to them in a respectful manner,” thereby
enhancing the likelihood that they will feel positive about
and support the outcome of these hearings.247
VI. COMBINING THE PRINCIPLES OF RESTORATIVE AND
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE TO FIND A BETTER MEANS TO RESPOND
TO MANY OFFENDERS WITH A MENTAL DISORDER
A. Restorative and Procedural Justice in the Context of
Mental Disorders
Combining the principles of restorative and procedural
justice within a dispute-resolution model has received a
limited degree of attention, usually in the context of a
discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence.248 Although the
primary focus of each is ostensibly different—the former
focusing more on the victim of a crime and the latter more
on the offender249—both seek to do more than simply process
244. Poythress et al., supra note 14, at 521.
245. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
246. Poythress et al., supra note 14, at 519-21, 526-27.
247. Id. at 521.
248. See, e.g., Blackwell & Cunningham, supra note 184, at 67-83; Scheff,
supra note 215, at 97-98; Schopp, supra note 149, at 667; Tyler et al., supra note
242, at 553. For a discussion of several programs combining these elements, see
Blackwell & Cunningham, supra note 184, at 59.
249. It should be noted that both the procedural and the restorative justice
paradigms are attuned to the alternative perspective as well. Thus, restorative
justice also addresses the mindset and involvement of the offender, see supra
notes 208-11, 226-37 and accompanying text, while procedural justice is also
sensitive to the victims‟ perceptions. See Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice:
Tempering the State‟s Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1843, 1903-04 (2002).
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criminal cases in the most efficient and expeditious manner.
They recognize that ignoring the victims‟ and the offenders‟
perceptions and the emotional impact of the criminal
proceedings on them is often counterproductive and can
leave long-term scars that are ultimately harmful, not only
to the parties involved, but for society in general.250
A failure to address these shortcomings places the
parties at risk and enhances the likelihood that similar
events will occur in the future. For example, if the wounds
of the victim and the anger of the offender are unresolved,
this will undercut the ability of both of them to learn,
understand, and move forward; to form trusting
relationships; and to fulfill roles as productive members of
society.251
A well-crafted restorative justice approach incorporates
procedural justice principles by providing both the victim
and the offender with a forum in which they will have an
opportunity to systematically raise and address their
concerns and needs, explore the interconnection and
interdependence of events in a neutral and trustworthy
fashion, and share and probe their personal stories.252 This
kind of environment can help offenders recognize and begin
to understand and address their behaviors and the impact
of these behaviors, while promoting both their own recovery
and that of their victims.253 Instead of the threatening,
formal, and oppositional atmosphere of the courtroom,
restorative justice programs with procedural justice
elements
attempt
to
promote
mutual
respect,
understanding, and inclusiveness.254 Further, research
shows participants in restorative justice programs perceive
they are treated more fairly than in traditional court
proceedings, another key procedural justice element.255
250. See supra Parts IV, V.
251. See Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 14.
252. See supra Part IV.
253. See supra Part IV.
254. See supra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
255. Hennessey Hayes & Kathleen Daly, Conferencing and Re-offending in
Queensland, 37 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 167, 186-87 (2004); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 161, 174 (2007); Poulson, supra note 188, at 182.
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One context where the two approaches can be
particularly well joined and applied involves offenders with
a mental disorder. Such a model can promote the
psychological well-being of these offenders and their victims
without sacrificing other important societal and legal goals.
These approaches may also provide a means to slow the
cycle of recidivism which many offenders with a mental
disorder find themselves unable to escape.256
For example, offenders with a mental disorder who
suffer from a heightened distrust of others may feel much
more relaxed and willing to speak in a restorative justice
session and, as a result of having their voice heard, be more
likely to accept responsibility for the criminal behavior,
express remorse and seek forgiveness for their actions, and
take steps, such as obtaining services to address their
mental disorder, that will diminish the likelihood of future
criminal behavior.257 Further, by providing a forum where
offenders are encouraged to speak and feel comfortable
doing so, the victims of these offenses will gain greater
insight into what led the offender to act, including the
impact of the mental disorder, be more willing to forgive the
offender, and be able to place these events behind them and
feel secure again in the community.258
Also, restorative justice may prompt offenders with a
mental disorder to be more dedicated to their own
256. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 96, at 22; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 7, at 193; Kondo, supra note 119, at 374; see also supra notes 117-19
and accompanying text.
257. See Kirk & Bersoff, supra note 142, at 57-58 (“[M]ental health treatment
consumers are particularly sensitive to the presence of coercion and react
particularly negatively to the persons and systems that exercise the coercion.”).
258. See Sean Fewster, When Victims Forgive the Unforgiveable, THE
TELEGRAPH (Austl.), (May 14, 2011), http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/why-weforgive-the-unforgiveable/story-fn6b3v4f-1226055723516
(“[F]orgiveness
in
criminal cases tends to fall into one of three categories. The victims of crimes
involving spouses, mental illness or reckless driving are most likely to forgive
offenders. . . . „If we can say that a person had a mental illness, diminished
responsibility or a lack of culpability at the time of a crime, then we are more
able to forgive.‟ . . . „Forgiveness is easier with cases of mental illness because
the context is clearly that the offender is suffering as well . . . . People
acknowledge the crime was hurtful and tragic, but by the same token there are
extenuating circumstances.‟” (quoting Dr. Alan Campbell, senior lecturer at the
University of South Australia‟s School of Psychology, Social Work, and Social
Policy)).
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restoration. They may begin to understand the effect of
their actions on victims and the community, to gain insights
into the nature of their disorder, and to more fully commit
themselves to rehabilitation.259 Studies of successful
restorative justice programs intersect with the claims of
procedural justice theory, as results indicate that the active
involvement of individuals with a mental disorder in
negotiating and designing their treatment programs
enhances adherence and favorable outcomes.260 Offenders
may, as a result, be more receptive to efforts to assist them
and provide them with needed services. Participating in the
process of apology and forgiveness, as well as having been
given an opportunity to state their case in a neutral forum
where they are accepted and treated as a human being,261
can motivate offenders with a mental disorder to make
positive changes in their self-esteem, attitudes, and
behavior.
Restorative justice has also been shown to help
offenders strengthen their support networks, which may in
turn result in greater opportunities for rehabilitation
outside of the CJS.262 Relatedly, allowing offenders with a
mental disorder to participate in restorative justice
programs may serve to heighten community awareness and
understanding of mental disorders.263 Broken links between
the community and individuals with mental disorders who
feel disconnected from society may be reforged and, further,
259. See SURGEON GENERAL‟S REPORT, supra note 2, at 99 (asserting that
research suggests rediscovery and reconstruction of a sense of self are important
to recovery for individuals with a mental illness); Barbara Tooth et al., Factors
Consumers Identify as Important to Recovery from Schizophrenia, 11
AUSTRALASIAN PSYCHIATRY S70, S72 (2003) (noting that among individuals with
schizophrenia, the most frequently cited goals were to develop an active sense of
self, to get better, and to manage their illness).
260. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, in
LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 149, at 165, 165-67.
261. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
262. Gwen Robinson & Joanna Shapland, Reducing Recidivism: A Task for
Restorative Justice?, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 337, 345 (2008).
263. See Patrick W. Corrigan & Alicia K. Matthews, Stigma and Disclosure:
Implications for Coming Out of the Closet, 12 J. MENTAL HEALTH 235, 235 (2003)
(“Members of the general public are more likely to diminish prejudicial attitudes
and discriminating behaviors when they have contact with people with mental
illness.”).
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the community may be prompted to develop additional
service programs for these offenders.264
Another valuable aspect of including offenders with
mental disorders in these programs is that the resulting
restitution targets the individual needs of both the victims
and the offenders.265 During their interactions, participants
can come to a mutual agreement about what needs to be
done to heal the breach of society‟s norms. This may include
identifying or developing services that specifically address
the mental health needs of both the offender and the victim.
Conceptually, there do not appear to be inherent
obstacles to implementing a restorative justice program
that employs the principles of procedural justice and
encompasses offenders with a mental disorder, although
reports and empirical analyses of such an approach are
generally lacking.266 In light of the wide-spread concern
about the traditional CJS processing of offenders with a
mental disorder,267 exploration of this alternative model,
either in conjunction with or independent of a mental health
court or the other CJS alternatives previously discussed,268
is needed and timely. The remainder of this Article is
devoted to a preliminary exploration of how such a program
might be structured.

264. As discussed, there is a shortage of both support for and resources needed
to sustain such programs. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 200-02, 210-11 and accompanying text.
266. Although empirical data have generally not been systematically gathered,
Lawrie Parker, Executive Director of the Piedmont Dispute Resolution Center in
Virginia, asserts that her organization—which has been providing dispute
resolution services in general for over twenty years and restorative justice
sessions involving criminal offenders and their victims for at least the past
twelve years—has successfully conducted many restorative justice sessions
involving offenders with a mental disorder. Lawrie Parker, Executive Director,
Piedmont Dispute Resolution Center, Remarks at the Virginia Mediation
Network Spring Conference (Mar. 20, 2011).
267. See supra Part II.
268. See supra Part III.
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B. Employing a Restorative Justice Model Incorporating
Procedural Justice Principles When Offenders with a
Mental Disorder Are Involved
The first step in deciding whether to employ this model
in a given case should be to examine the underlying charge
to see whether an offense appropriate for inclusion is
involved. To avoid public opposition to their activities, many
restorative justice programs only accept offenders who have
committed lesser crimes, such as misdemeanors.269 Like
mental health and drug courts,270 restorative justice
programs are more likely to choose such cases for diversion,
notwithstanding that this may not encompass all cases that
might benefit from a restorative justice approach.271
This is not likely to be a major impediment as the
majority of offenders with a mental disorder are charged
with low-level offenses.272 In a survey of jail officials, the
most common reasons for incarcerating offenders with a
mental illness were assault, theft, disorderly conduct,
269. Notorious or violent crimes tend not to be accepted because they are
likely to have consequences beyond those experienced by the immediate victim,
namely, they threaten society in general and, although the victim may
ultimately forgive the offender, the resolution reached by the victim and the
offender may be perceived as failing to satisfy society‟s interests in retribution,
deterrence, and incapacitation, and thereby undercut support for restorative
justice programs in general. Some programs also focus on a particular group of
offenders (juveniles) or victims (victims of domestic violence) thought to have
special needs or to be particularly likely to benefit from this approach. See, e.g.,
Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative
Conferencing Models, 2001 JUV. JUST. BULL. 1 (2001); Lawrence W. Sherman,
Domestic Violence and Restorative Justice: Answering Key Questions, 8 VA. J.
SOC. POL‟Y & L. 263, 265-68 (2000).
270. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
271. Wolff, supra note 146, at 431, 434; see also Rachel Alexandra Rossi, Meet
Me on Death Row: Post-Sentence Victim-Offender Mediation in Capital Cases, 9
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 185, 186 (2008); Brenda V. Smith, Battering,
Forgiveness, and Redemption, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‟Y & L. 921, 937
(2003). But see Elizabeth Beck et al., Seeking Sanctuary: Interviews with Family
Members of Capital Defendants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 382, 414 (2003) (advocating
application of a restorative justice response to families of capital defendants).
272. DITTON, supra note 95, at 4 (“[T]he majority of mentally ill offenders in
jail or probation had committed a property [31.3% and 30.4%, respectively] or
public-order offense [23.2% and 24.7%, respectively].”); TORREY, supra note 76,
at 37-41; Torrey, supra note 76, at 1612.
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alcohol or drug related charges, and trespassing.273 Indeed,
common forms of theft among offenders with a mental
illness included shoplifting and a failure to pay for
restaurant meals.274 If there is an identifiable victim, these
types of crimes would be particularly appropriate subjects
for restorative justice conferencing.275
This analysis, however, should not be construed to
suggest that all cases where an offender with a mental
disorder is charged with a felony or a crime that involved
violence should be excluded. Violent crimes are beginning to
be referred to more advanced restorative justice programs,
although these cases do require more preparation and
mediators schooled in advanced techniques.276 The safety of
the victim and society should be key factors in deciding
whether to allow an offender with a mental disorder who
committed a violent crime to participate, although the mere
presence of a mental disorder should not serve as the basis
for concluding that a high risk is posed by the offender, as
mental disorders are generally not associated with
dangerousness.277 Thus, a restorative justice approach may
be possible for these cases as well if the victim and the
offender are willing participants and adequate steps to
ensure the protection of the victim and society have been
instituted.278

273. Torrey, supra note 76, at 1612.
274. Id.
275. As noted, supra note 191, some restorative justice programs are amenable
to also addressing so-called “victimless” crimes—such as traffic offenses, drug
possession, prostitution, and gambling—with a focus on repairing harm to or
“restoring” the community at large. See BAZEMORE & SCHIFF , supra note 195, at
27.
276. See Bloch, supra note 218, at 207; see, e.g., Laurie S. Kohn, What‟s So
Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative Justice as a New
Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 576
(2010); see also MARK S. UMBREIT, CTR. FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE &
PEACEMAKING, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE CONFERENCING: GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM
SENSITIVE PRACTICE 6-7, 17-19 (2000), available at http://www.cehd.umn.edu/
ssw/rjp/resources/rj_dialogue_resources/Restorative_Group_Conferencing/RJC%
20Guidlines%20Victim%20Sensitive%20Practice.pdf.
277. See ELYN R. SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF
50 (2002); supra note 5 and accompanying text.

THE MENTALLY ILL

278. See UMBREIT, supra note 276, at 17-19.
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A second step that could limit the participation of an
offender with a mental disorder279 is the expectation that the
offender and the victim are prepared and able to participate
in the program and embrace the results. The necessary
remorse, apology, and forgiveness are unlikely to occur if
the parties are unwilling or unable to communicate with
each other and tell their stories, or obtain a certain level of
empathy for and understanding of one another. Symptoms
of a mental disorder that are present at the time of a
restorative justice session may curtail the offender‟s ability
to participate and impede the likelihood the program will
succeed in general. For example, some offenders may not
understand the purpose of the program or trust the
participants, others may not have sufficient insight into
their behavior to feel the remorse and responsibility
necessary to make the process work, and still others may be
unable to adequately communicate with the victim and
express regret for their actions.280 Such symptoms may also
limit the willingness of victims to accept an offender‟s
expressed apology as genuine, sincere, and enduring.
Victims may also lack an adequate understanding of mental
disorders in general or the offender‟s mental disorder in
particular, which in turn may contribute to such a
heightened level of fear, antipathy, or distrust that a victim
will be unable to interact with the offender in such a way as
to enable the process of restorative justice to proceed.281
Thus, offenders with a mental disorder should have the
functional ability to participate in the gathering. If their
mental disorder may significantly impair their factual or
rational understanding of the proceedings or their ability to
279. The following caveats may apply as well to a victim who is unable to
participate and embrace the results because of a mental disorder.
280. Conversely, offenders with a mental disorder, such as individuals who
suffer from depression, may feel an overwhelming sense of guilt and
unhappiness that makes it difficult for them to accept forgiveness by the victim.
See Lynn E. O‟Connor et al., Empathy and Depression: The Moral System on
Overdrive, in EMPATHY IN MENTAL ILLNESS 49, 49-51 (Tom Farrow & Peter
Woodruff eds., 2007).
281. As will be discussed, a properly trained facilitator should be prepared to
address any unfounded stereotypes, beliefs, or fears regarding mental disorders.
See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
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communicate with the parties involved, or may result in the
offender being disruptive or threatening,282 it may be
necessary for the facilitator to screen them (which will often
necessitate input from a mental health professional) to
determine whether they are capable of participating in the
restorative justice proceeding. However, because of the
significant benefits that may accrue, the presumption
should be that offenders are capable of participating, and it
should be recognized that most offenders, including those
with a mental disorder, are found competent to stand trial
within the CJS.283
Nevertheless, a relatively small number of offenders
with a severe mental disorder may not be able to reach the
requisite standard for participation without extended
treatment, if at all. Even if treatment is ultimately effective
for them, the approach described in this Article may not be
an effective CJS alternative284 if a large gap of time has
282. These requirements parallel the standards associated with a criminal
defendant‟s competency to stand trial and a judge‟s determination that a
disruptive criminal defendant should be removed from the courtroom. See
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (“[T]he test [for competency to
stand trial] must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” (quoting Brief of the Solicitor General)); Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been accepted that a person
whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to
assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”); Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975) (no right “to abuse the dignity of the
courtroom”); id. at 834 n.46 (no right to “engag[e] in serious and obstructionist
misconduct”).
283. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 141 (3d ed. 2007);
Daniel C. Murrie et al., Clinician Variation in Findings of Competence to Stand
Trial, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 177, 179 (2008); see also SAKS, supra note
277, at 47 (“Incompetency is a very low standard, and many if not most mentally
ill people are competent in many if not most areas of their lives.” (emphasis
added)).
284. It should be noted that such offenders may be deemed incompetent to
stand trial by the CJS as well. Alternatively, pursuant to an insanity defense, or
some variant thereof, the CJS may determine that they should be acquitted
because they lack, as a result of their mental disorder, the requisite criminal
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passed since the occurrence of the criminal behavior.285 This
delay may result in the damage to the victim becoming
either so entrenched or distant in time as to make recovery
relatively unlikely, as well as diminish the ability of the
parties to sufficiently recall the relevant underlying events
and circumstances to engage in the needed exchange of
information.286 However, a prompt adjustment of medication
or another form of treatment may enable even offenders
with a severe mental disorder to actively participate in a
restorative justice session. At the same time, voluntary
participation is a key to these sessions and coercion is
generally antithetical to the principles of procedural justice
and oftentimes counterproductive with this population.
Thus, forced treatment should not occur in conjunction with
or in preparation for these sessions.287
Because a mental disorder may influence interactions
between the parties in a variety of adverse ways, the
facilitator of the session should be specially trained to work
with such offenders and be prepared to implement the
program with the offender‟s mental disorder in mind.
Appropriate preparations may include having discussions
with the victim about the nature of mental disorders in
responsibility. See LAFAVE, supra note 47, at 390, 424-34. However, such
matters reach beyond the scope of this Article.
285. Similarly, in the CJS, the State is only given a “reasonable period of time”
to attempt to restore a defendant to competence. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (“[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who
is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be
held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether
there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the
foreseeable future.”).
286. This may also occur in the CJS, with the prosecutor sometimes dropping
the charges as a result. See LAFAVE, supra note 47, at 434.
287. See supra notes 172-73, 245 and accompanying text. See generally
Kaltiala-Heino et al., supra note 142, at 311 (questioning the value of
compulsory treatment). In contrast, within the CJS, it has been established that
under certain circumstances a criminal defendant may be subject to involuntary
treatment to restore competence to stand trial. See Sell v. United States, 539
U.S. 166, 178-79 (2003). The principles guiding that ruling are largely
inapplicable to a restorative justice conference, particularly as the default option
to a restorative justice conference is the return of the offender to the traditional
CJS.
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general and the mental disorder of the offender in
particular, and the impact this may have on the session. A
properly trained facilitator should also have the ability and
be prepared to address any related unfounded stereotypes,
beliefs, or fears about mental illness.288 Patently false beliefs
may be addressed in a prior, private meeting between the
facilitator and the victim, particularly if they are likely to
lead the victim to decline participation in the session
because of concerns about personal safety. However, this
topic may well be a suitable subject for the session itself as
offenders may be able to provide valuable input regarding
their mental disorder, whether and how the mental disorder
contributed to the behavior associated with the criminal
offense, and what steps the offender has taken to address
the mental disorder to significantly diminish the likelihood
that such behavior will recur.
The facilitator of these sessions should also be aware
that cognitive, emotional, or behavioral disorders of
offenders may limit or affect their participation, including
their ability to follow and participate in the proceedings,
although the facilitator should also guard against
presumptions that this will be the case.289 If the speech or
thought of offenders is highly disorganized, it may be hard
for victims and other participants to understand, relate to,
and interact with the offenders. If the offenders cannot stay
on task, the victims may become extremely frustrated or
even frightened. They ultimately may perceive the crimes to
have been spontaneous and uncontrollable acts and feel
vulnerable to further occurrences. After learning more
about the nature of a mental disorder, however, victims may
288. See Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels,
Causes, Dangerousness, and Social Distance, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1328, 133132 (1999) (characterizing public conceptions of mental illness).
289. See SAKS, supra note 277, at 52-53 (“[A]lthough many mentally ill people
are impaired, lack judgment, and are less in control than are healthy people,
many do not have these characteristics. . . . Because there is so much temptation
to find deficits in the mentally ill where none exist, we may want a standard
through which we bend over backwards not to treat the mentally ill differently
from the healthy. . . . In addition . . . when we estimate their deficits accurately,
treating them paternalistically may actually increase those deficits by further
marginalizing them, reducing their self-esteem and sense of agency so that they
become less capable of caring for themselves and living responsibly in the
world.”).
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choose to proceed with the session even if the offenders are
relatively inarticulate simply because they wish to be heard
and to express their sense of injustice at being the target of
a crime.290 In addition, even offenders who are relatively
inarticulate or unable to fully understand the nature of the
proceedings may benefit from being given an opportunity to
participate, which, pursuant to the principles of procedural
justice, may enhance their ability to respect and accept the
outcomes of this and other proceedings that stem from the
commission of the crime.291
Restorative justice also relies heavily on the ability of
the parties to empathize with each other, which is
considered necessary to precipitate change and recovery.
Some offenders with a mental disorder may not be
sufficiently able to empathize with their victims.292
Offenders with an anti-social personality disorder, for
example, may be limited in their ability to be involved
emotionally in this manner with their victims.293 Empathy
and understanding have little relevance to the traditional
CJS with its emphasis on punishment, but are vital to the
success of a restorative justice session. One commentator
has observed that “this [lack of empathy] has implications
for how successful conferencing may be . . . . Until there is
some awareness of the feelings or emotions of . . . others,
conferencing may be unlikely to alter behavior.”294
Another potential barrier to participation by offenders
with a mental disorder is that the offender may have to
acknowledge and disclose his or her mental disorder for the
restorative justice program to be successful. In the
290. See UMBREIT, supra note 276, at 4.
291. See supra Part V. Steps should be taken by the facilitator, however, to
ensure that dialogue in the session does not become a one-way street where
castigation is dumped on offenders unable to respond.
292. See, e.g., Kwang-Hyuk Lee, Empathy Deficits in Schizophrenia, in
EMPATHY IN MENTAL ILLNESS, supra note 280, at 17, 27 (finding that individuals
suffering from schizophrenia may show abnormal empathy deficits). The victim
must generally also have the capacity to empathize with the offender for the
session to be successful.
293. Mairead Dolan & Rachael Fullam, Empathy, Antisocial Behaviour and
Personality Pathology, in EMPATHY IN MENTAL ILLNESS, supra note 280, at 33,
38-39.
294. Kenneth S. Levy, The Australian Juvenile Justice System: Legal and
Social Science Dimensions, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 521, 551 (1999).
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traditional CJS, offenders with a mental disorder may
choose to reveal their disorder as part of a defense or as a
mitigating factor during sentencing. However, such a
disclosure is not required and, provided there has not been
a finding that the offender is incompetent to stand trial,
some offenders choose to remain silent about their condition
because they are embarrassed or because they fear they
may be stigmatized by this disclosure and suffer adverse
consequences as a result.295
In a restorative justice context, offenders may need to
discuss their mental disorder with the victim so the victim
can fully understand and forgive the offense.296 However,
offenders may be reluctant to disclose their disorder in
general or may feel particularly uncomfortable doing so
with either a victim who is a relative stranger or someone
who they know but to whom they have never disclosed their
disorder.297 Some offenders may be so unwilling to discuss
their condition that they would rather forego the benefits of
participation in such a program.298 Alternatively, for some
offenders, the mental disorder may have little relevance to
the offense, making its disclosure arguably unnecessary. In
general, however, it will be beneficial and perhaps vital for
them to reveal their mental disorder openly and to discuss
and acknowledge the role that it may have played in the
offense. With the assistance of a trained facilitator, such a
295. See Kevin Dew et al., „It Puts Things Out of Your Control‟: Fear of
Consequences as a Barrier to Patient Disclosure of Mental Health Issues to
General Practitioners, 29 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 1059, 1059 (2007); Joseph H.
Rodriguez et al., The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and
Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 401-02 (1983) (ascertaining that
defendants who unsuccessfully assert an insanity defense serve significantly
longer sentences than defendants who did not assert an insanity defense).
296. Such disclosures may also be optimal to ensure that the assigned
facilitator has the requisite skills and knowledge to properly prepare for and
manage the session.
297. See Dew et al., supra note 295, at 1059 (discussing reluctance to disclose
mental illness).
298. One of the responsibilities of the facilitators of these sessions should be to
explore privately with offenders possible consequences that may flow from
disclosure and, to the extent that they can, promise to address and ameliorate
any deleterious impact. See Dew et al., supra note 295, at 1062. Performing such
steps will be critical to maintaining the “trust” that offenders place in these
sessions, a key from a procedural justice perspective. See supra notes 229, 247
and accompanying text.
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discussion can generate greater understanding, forgiveness,
and support from the victim.
Because offenders with mental disorders vary in how
they perceive their disorder, including whether they
acknowledge that they have a mental disorder, 299 only those
offenders who feel comfortable sharing information
concerning their mental disorder should be expected to do so
in the course of a restorative justice session. At the same
time, if the mental disorder played a central role in the
offense and if the restorative process is unlikely without a
discussion of the mental disorder, disclosure may be
necessary for the program to proceed. A properly trained
facilitator can provide valuable input and guidance as to
whether and how such disclosures should occur.
VII. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THIS MODEL AND REBUTTAL
Some judges and lawyers have objected to the adoption
of restorative justice programs regardless of the offender‟s
mental state.300 One criticism is that restorative justice
sanctions may lack proportionality and consistency. 301
Because the offender and victim acting jointly are free to
adopt the outcome that they deem fit, the restitution
imposed on the offender may seem disproportionate to the
severity of the offense.302 In addition, critics argue, offenders
299. Of late, greater attention has been given to a sub-population of
individuals with a mental disorder who are characterized as being rendered
unable to recognize their symptoms because of a condition labeled
“anosognosia.” A somewhat controversial diagnosis, there is an ongoing debate
over whether such individuals should be subject to treatment over objection. See
Ronald Bassman, Mental Illness and the Freedom to Refuse Treatment: Privilege
or Right, 36 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 488, 488 (2005). Ultimately, it will be
up to the parties, guided by the facilitator, to determine whether a sufficient
exchange of information can occur under these circumstances to warrant
holding a restorative justice session.
300. See Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic
Appeal of Restorative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 758-71 (2000) (examining
criticisms of restorative justice); Sharon Levrant et al., Reconsidering
Restorative Justice: The Corruption of Benevolence Revisited?, 45 CRIME &
DELINQ. 3 (1999); Harry Mika et al., Listening to Victims—A Critique of
Restorative Justice Policy and Practice in the United States, 68 FED. PROBATION
32 (2004).
301. Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 21.
302. Id.
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involved in similar crimes may end up with quite different
sanctions, sacrificing the objective of uniformity in
sentencing.303 These critics are concerned that the wishes of
the victims may dictate case outcomes that diverge
substantially from other cases.304 However, it should be
noted that similar cases are not always treated alike in the
traditional CJS;305 indeed, a number of inappropriate factors
such as gender, race, ethnicity, and socio-economic status
contribute to these inconsistencies.306 In addition, offenders
with a mental disorder may already be subject to
considerable dispositional disparities within the traditional
CJS.307 Inconsistent outcomes in restorative justice
programs are at least the “result of genuine and uncoerced
agreement between the key parties,” which may be a
suitable ground for this disparity.308

303. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative
Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 433; Delgado, supra note
300, at 759, 768; see also David Dolinko, Restorative Justice and the
Justification of Punishment, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 319, 331-34; Paul H. Robinson,
The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative Justice,” 2003
UTAH L. REV. 375, 381.
304. Andrew Ashworth & Andrew von Hirsch, Desert and the Three Rs, in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 331, 332-33 (Andrew
von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1998).
305. Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 21.
306. See, e.g., Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial
Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 35 LAW &
SOC‟Y REV. 733, 733 (2001); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender
Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 285, 285 (2001); see also Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities in
Sentencing: Can Sentencing Reforms Reduce Discrimination in Punishment?, 64
U. COLO. L. REV. 781, 781 (1993).
307. See Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 398-99 (1992)
(referencing the denial of due process rights to individuals with a mental
illness).
308. Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 21. As discussed, a critical component
of a successful restorative justice program is that agreements are genuine and
not coerced. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. It also has been argued
that the traditional CJS approach is “silent on why equal justice for offenders
should be a higher value than equal justice (or, indeed, any kind of justice) for
victims.” Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 22.
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A second criticism is that restorative justice is
inadequate to deter offenders.309 Empirical evidence
contradicts this view.310 Being confronted by one‟s victim in
a restorative justice conference has been found not to be an
easy way out.311 This approach prevents the offender from
discounting the victim and requires a level of accountability
that is often not required by the traditional CJS.312
Third, critics argue that power imbalances between the
offender and victim may result in the victim being used to
benefit the offender.313 For example, victims may feel
pressured to agree to a relatively insignificant sanction
when the typical penalty for the offense would involve
incarceration, or they may be made to feel ashamed of their
desire for vengeance and retribution towards the person
who harmed them.314 Indeed, it is important to ensure that
victims are not further victimized when they agree to
participate in a dialogue with the offender.315 Further,
participation must be voluntary, and the victim must fully
agree with any proposed outcome.316 In fact, in most
restorative justice systems, victims are allowed to veto any
proposed outcome.317 Furthermore, facilitators should be
trained to recognize and defuse any potential pressures that
may be brought to bear on victims before or during a
session. They should take steps to shield the victim from
this pressure or stop the process when the offender has, or
is likely to, abuse the process.318 For example, when the
offense involves a violent offender and a relatively passive
309. See Bloch, supra note 218, at 209; Robinson, supra note 303, at 377
(claiming that “restorative justice ideally would ban all „punishment‟”).
310. Strang & Sherman, supra note 74, at 38-39.
311. See Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 22.
312. See id. at 17-18.
313. See Bloch, supra note 218, at 210; Delgado, supra note 300, at 762-63.
314. See ANNALISE ACORN, COMPULSORY COMPASSION: A CRITIQUE
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 76 (2004); Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 22.
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315. Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 22. But see Daly, supra note 232, at
352-53 (criticizing claims of further victimization when compared to the
victimizing effects of a formal court case).
316. See Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 22.
317. Id.
318. See id.
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intimate partner, an additional party may need to be
involved to provide support for the partner.319 Similarly, if
the offender has a mental disorder and intimidates the
victim, the proceeding may be suspended, or a mental
health professional or other party may be added to the
proceeding to support or protect the victim.320
Fourth, some skeptics of restorative justice assert that
the legal rights of the offender are likely to be infringed in
this informal setting.321 Offenders with a mental disorder
may indeed be particularly vulnerable to such an occurrence
as they may be relatively incapable of independently
asserting their legal rights in this context. For example,
some such individuals may be prone to accepting
responsibility for an offense even though they lack
culpability.322 Individual legal rights may be protected,
however, by directing offenders to consult with their
attorney or otherwise obtain legal advice before beginning a
restorative justice session.323 If the offender refuses legal
advice, the facilitator of the session may need to explore the
reasons for this refusal as part of a larger determination of
whether the offender is capable of participating in the
319. The power imbalance criticism also fails to take into account that in many
domestic violence situations victims do not rely on the CJS at all because of
perceived deficiencies in that system. Id. at 22-23. For example, a victim may
want the behavior to stop but not necessarily want the partner to be
incarcerated. A restorative justice program can increase the victim‟s options
significantly. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You Have Is a Hammer:
Society‟s Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U. L. REV.
919, 923 (2011) (“The most common reason victims provide for not reporting an
[intimate partner violence] incident to the police is that the matter is private or
personal; other rationales include fear of retaliation, a desire to shield the
offender, and police ineffectiveness.”).
320. Proponents of the restorative justice approach further maintain that
“[c]riticisms about restorative justice „using‟ victims . . . ignore the fact that
conventional justice uses victims for its own (the State‟s) interests without
offering any corresponding benefits.” Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 22; see
supra note 250 and accompanying text.
321. Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 23 (citing Kate Warner, Family
Group Conferences and the Rights of the Offender, in FAMILY CONFERENCING AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE WAY FORWARD OR MISPLACED OPTIMISM? 141 (Christine
Alder & Joy Wundersitz eds., 1994)).
322. See O‟Connor et al., supra note 280, at 49-50.
323. See Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 23.
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proceedings.324 In addition, a facilitator may ask the parties
to enter into a confidentiality agreement prior to the
commencement of the proceedings to ensure that the
privacy and rights of the parties are respected.325
A fifth concern is that restorative justice is too similar
to popular justice and vigilantism.326 Popular justice can be
repressive and overly retributive, particularly when
offenders with a mental disorder are involved as such
offenders tend to generate considerable antipathy from the
general public.327 However, such attitudes are deeply at odds
with the themes of restorative justice and there are
safeguards that can be applied to prevent such attitudes
from prevailing. For example, scholars have suggested that
“if there are concerns about communities taking over this
process for non-restorative purposes, checks could be
introduced—for example, courts could provide some
oversight of restorative justice outcomes for the purposes of
ensuring that the outcomes are in accordance with
restorative justice values.”328 As discussed, when offenders
324. See supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
325. See Tina S. Ikpa, Balancing Restorative Justice Principles and Due Process
Rights in Order to Reform the Criminal Justice System, 24 W ASH. U. J.L. &
POL ‟Y 301, 316-17 (2007). It might be argued that such a confidentiality
agreement and the discussion of the parties‟ respective rights may make these
proceedings too formal or dissuade the parties from participating in these
sessions. It should be noted, however, that similar concerns were raised about
law enforcement officials being required to disclose to suspects their “Miranda”
rights, but subsequent research has found that the issuance of these warnings
has had little, if any, impact on the rate of confessions by these suspects.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda‟s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 547 (1996) (“For
practical purposes, Miranda‟s demonstrable impact on conviction rates today is
virtually nil.”). Also, lawyers could be allowed to attend these sessions but they
would need to understand the difference between restorative and conventional
CJS proceedings and hence the change in their role. Morris & Young, supra note
199, at 23. In a conventional CJS setting, lawyers speak for the offender and
discourage the offender from talking directly with the victim; in a restorative
justice setting, offenders must speak for themselves and a direct dialogue
between victims and offenders must take place. The lawyer‟s primary purpose in
this context would be to protect the offender‟s basic rights and not to minimize
the offender‟s disclosures or responsibility. Id.
326. Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 23.
327. See Link et al., supra note 288, at 1328 (characterizing public conceptions
of mental illness).
328. Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 23.
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with a mental disorder are involved in the restorative
justice process, it may be necessary to employ facilitators
who have been specially trained to take appropriate steps to
defuse society‟s negative views about individuals and
offenders with mental disorders.329
A sixth criticism is that “restorative justice leaves
untouched a „hard core‟ of unrepentant offenders.”330 This is
undeniable; there will be some offenders, both with and
without a mental disorder, who will scoff at and refuse to
embrace and participate in a restorative justice approach.331
However, no system is likely to be successful universally,
and there will be many offenders who will be responsive to
this approach. Indeed, research indicates that offenders who
participate in a restorative justice program have lower
recidivism rates.332 Arguably, the restorative justice process
has greater potential than conventional CJS processes to
engage and hopefully reform many offenders with a mental
disorder.333 Although empirical evidence is lacking on the
amenability of these offenders to a restorative justice
approach, the growing prevalence of mental health courts
and the apparent willingness of offenders with a mental
illness to participate in the programs offered by these courts
suggests that these offenders will similarly be amenable to
restorative justice sessions.334
A final criticism of restorative justice is that it is
costly.335 Indeed, this process does not occur instantly or
automatically. Engaging offenders, victims, and other
participants takes time and effort. Multiple meetings may
be necessary. Obtaining trained facilitators and a neutral
location for sessions generally entails expenses, with many
329. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
330. Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 24.
331. See Delgado, supra note 300, at 765.
332. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 74, at 38, 39.
333. See generally Kirk & Bersoff, supra note 142, at 53-58 (discussing the
difficulties associated with forced mental health treatment in the traditional
CJS).
334. See supra Part III.C.
335. Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 24. For a review of the estimated costper-case of existing restorative justice programs, see Umbreit et al., supra note
186, at 289-90 (observing that it remains difficult to evaluate the cost of
implementing such programs on a large scale).
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of these offenders lacking the resources to help defray these
costs.336 It has been argued that “if [a restorative justice
approach] is used for minor offenses where the impact upon
the victim has been slight, then the costs might outweigh
the potential benefits.”337 For example, a loitering offense
might otherwise be resolved simply with the payment of a
relatively small fine. In addition, minor offenses may seem
to have little impact on their victims. Victim support
agencies, however, argue that such assumptions are not
often accurate.338 Even a relatively minor offense may be a
significant event to the individuals involved. Furthermore,
recognizing a victim‟s suffering, as well as involving and
responding to the victim in a humane fashion, have
considerable value in and of themselves.339 In addition, as
discussed, restorative justice offers significant benefits to
participating offenders.340 Instead of perceiving themselves
as society‟s outcasts, they can be reintegrated into society
and assisted in developing a plan for reparation and
recovery.341 Through this process, offenders with a mental
disorder may obtain help, support, and services that
address their needs and diminish the likelihood of future
criminal offenses and entanglement with the CJS.342 Finally,
the price of restorative justice programs must be weighed
against the cost of incarcerating mentally ill offenders. 343
336. See FRANK & GLIED, supra note 80, at 2 (“For the vast majority of people
with a severe mental illness, a life in poverty is to be expected; it is almost
preordained from the moment of diagnosis, which is often by late adolescence.”);
Daphna Levinson et al., Associations of Serious Mental Illness with Earnings:
Results from the WHO World Mental Health Surveys, 197 BRIT . J. PSYCHIATRY
114, 114 (2010) (finding that individuals with a serious mental illness earn on
average a third less than a nation‟s median earnings).
337. Morris & Young, supra note 199, at 24.
338. Id.
339. Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit
REGULATION, Jan./Feb. 1981, at 33, 36.
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1

340. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
342. See supra Part VI.B.
343. The monetary cost of the criminalization of mental illness includes the
direct costs of incarceration as well as the indirect costs of lost productivity and
other effects due to an inappropriate response to their mental disorder. For an
economic analysis of the direct cost of the public order response to mental
illness, see Pustilnik, supra note 121, at 219, 231-35 (estimating state prisons
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Compared to the cost of the traditional CJS response, such
costs may be quite small.344
CONCLUSION
Traditionalists criticize the restorative justice approach
as being a faddish, unrealistic approach that relies too much
on promises and misplaced sympathy.345 The principles
underlying the restorative justice approach, however, have
deep historical roots,346 and its expanding application and
current research indicate that this approach can frequently
better meet the needs of the victims of a criminal offense,
the responsible offenders, and society by enhancing
recovery, promoting a sense of community and
reintegration, and providing a better and more efficient
means of responding to many criminal acts.
Offenders with a mental disorder, who are among the
most challenging, not to mention expensive, populations
with which the CJS struggles, should not be excluded from
these benefits if they have the ability to participate in such
programs, particularly during an era of limited resources. A
restorative justice approach, tempered through the lens of
procedural justice, can often better respond to this
population without sacrificing other social and legal
objectives. Rather than being caught up in a
counterproductive CJS response, a restorative justice
session can be more beneficial to all concerned parties. In
addition to responding directly to the needs of all parties,
this approach may promote greater understanding and
insight into offenders‟ mental disorders, as well as the
impact of these disorders on them and the people around
them. In addition, the outcomes of these sessions can
address offenders‟ special needs, such as treatment and
counseling, which, in turn, may increase support in general
for such services in the community. These services have
traditionally been underfunded and are currently being
gutted in many jurisdictions. Furthermore, the underlying
spend about $4.75 billion annually to incarcerate non-violent mentally ill
offenders).
344. See id.; supra Part II.
345. See generally Delgado, supra note 300, at 758-71 (providing a critique of
the restorative justice paradigm).
346. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 184, at 5; STRANG, supra note 184, at 3-5.
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values of restorative justice—understanding, forgiveness,
and hope—are also more likely to motivate offenders with a
mental disorder to reach new therapeutic goals. Given a
chance to participate in making amends for their behavior,
they may be more likely to want to do a better job in the
future. Restorative justice is remarkable in that it
facilitates recovery in offenders, victims, and surrounding
communities. The opportunities it provides should not be
withheld from offenders with a mental disorder.

